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ANNUAL SURVEY OF ANTITRUST
DEVELOPMENTS-CLASS ACTIONS, MERGERS,
AND MARKET DEFINITION: A NEW TREND
TOWARD NEUTRALITY
JOHN

H.

SHENEFIELD*

The 1973-74 Term of the Supreme Court signaled the emergence
of a new trend in antitrust jurisprudence. In recent years, each new
antitrust decision seemed to produce victory for the government or
the private plaintiff. Expansion .of the scope of antitrust coverage has
been the order of the day. Many of the Court's decisions appeared to
push the frontiers of the law outward into uncharted areas without
careful consideration or, frequently, satisfying rationale.
For instance, the boundaries of per se illegality under the Sherman Act were substantially altered by such decisions as United
States v. Topco Associates, Inc.,' United States v. Container Corporationof America, 2 and United States v. Arnold, Schwinn & Co. 3 The
*Member of the firm of Hunton, Williams, Gay & Gibson, Richmond, Virginia.
A.B. (1960), LL.B. (1965), Harvard University.
1 405 U.S. 596 (1972). See, e.g., Note, The Supreme Court, 1971 Term, 86 HARv.

L. Ray. 1, 241-47 (1972); Comment, Horizontal TerritorialRestraintsand the Per Se
Rule, 28 WASH. & LEE L. Rav. 457 (1971).
2 393 U.S. 333 (1969). See, e.g., Note, Antitrust Implications of the Exchange of
PriceInformationAmong Competitors-TheContainer Corporation Case, 68 MicH. L.
Rav. 720 (1970); Note, The Supreme Court, 1968 Term, 83 HARV. L. REV. 1, 227-35
(1969).
3388 U.S. 365 (1967). See, e.g., Averill, Sealy, Schwinn and Sherman One: An
Analysis and Prognosis, 15 N.Y.L.F. 39 (1969); Keck, The Schwinn Case, 23 Bus. LAW.
669 (1968); Kittelle, Territorialand Customer Restrictions Through Consignment or
Agency-Schwinn or Sin?, 12 ANrrauST BULL. 1007 (1967); McLaren, Territorialand
Customer Restrictions, Consignments, Suggested Resale Prices and Refusals to Deal,
37 A.B.A. ANrrTRUST L.J. 137 (1968); Pollock, AlternativeDistributionMethods After
Schwinn, 63 Nw.U.L. REv. 595 (1968); Williams, Distributionand the Sherman
Act-The Effects of General Motors, Schwinn, and Sealy, 1967 Duaa L.J. 732 (1967);
Zimmerman, DistributionRestrictionsAfter Schwinn and Sealy, 12 ANTITRUST BULL.
1181 (1967). See also, Preston, RestrictiveDistributionArrangements:EconomicAnal-
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law of mergers and market definition was remade in United States
v. Pabst Brewing Co., 4 United States v. Von's Grocery Co., 5 and
United States v. Grinnell Corp.' Perma Life Mufflers, Inc. v. International Parts Corp.7 and Albrecht v. Herald Co.I threatened to take all
meaning from the Sherman Act's requirement for a contract, combination or conspiracy.
But in the last several Terms with the crescendo of nationwide
economic difficulty and the alteration of the Court's prevalent philosophy which has accompanied the shift in personnel, the innovative
and expansive thrust of the Court's antitrust decisions has been replaced by an increasing desire to consolidate the gains and to rationalize the results. The Court seems to have adopted a more neutral
stance. No longer is the defendant assumed necessarily to be wrong,
nor the government's position, despite assorted legal defects, assumed automatically to be meritorious.
This new trend took hold during the most recent Term in a
number of critical areas. The Court took a firm grip on the development of class actions and in a notable decision required that, where
possible, the class members must be individually notified at the expense of the plaintiff class representative.' In Zahn v. International
Paper Co.'0 the Supreme Court required that the separate claim of
each member of a class of multiple plaintiffs must satisfy the jurisdictional amount for suits in federal courts. In the merger area, the
ysis and Public Policy Standards,30 LAW & CONTEMP. PROB. 506 (1965). For an article
questioning the effectiveness of the Schwinn per se rule, see Note, Exceptions to
Schwinn's Per Se Rule: Their Validity and Implicationsfor the Future, 31 WASH. &
LEE L. REv. 643 (1974).
384 U.S. 546 (1966). See, e.g., Note, Section of the Country as a SubsidiaryIssue
in Litigation Brought Under Section 7 of the Clayton Act, 52 CoRNELL L. REv. 600
(1967); Note, Competition and the Geographic Market Under § 7 of the Clayton Act,
62 Nw. U.L. REv. 58 (1968).
384 U.S. 280 (1966). See, e.g., Bison, The Von's Grocery Merger Case-Antitrust
in Reverse, 55 GEO. L.J. 201 (1966); Note, The Supreme Court, 1965 Term, 80 HARv.
L. REv. 1, 245-47 (1966); Note, Competition and the Geographic Market Under § 7 of
the Clayton Act, 62 Nw. U.L. REv. 58 (1968).
1 384 U.S. 563 (1966). See, e.g., Note, The Supreme Court, 1965 Term, 80 HARv.
L. REv. 1, 240-45 (1966).
392 U.S. 134 (1968). See, e.g., Comment, The In Pari Delicto Doctrine Is Not a
Defense to a Private Antitrust Action if the Parties are not Equally Responsible for
the Violation, Perma Life Mufflers, Inc. v. International Parts Corp., 47 TEXAS L. REV.
322 (1969); Note, The Supreme Court, 1967 Term, 82 HARv. L. Rxv. 1, 260-66 (1968).
8 390 U.S. 145 (1968). See, e.g., Comment, Albrecht v. Herald Co.-Resale Price
Fixing, 63 Nw. U.L. REv. 862 (1969); Note, The Supreme Court, 1967 Term, 82 HARv.
L. REv. 1, 254-60 (1968).
1 Eisen v. Carlisle & Jacquelin, 417 U.S. 156 (1974).
,0 414 U.S. 291 (1973).
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Supreme Court looked beyond the statistical case, which had so frequently in recent years led to success for the government, to other
pertinent factors in considering an acquisition." Similarly, in United
States v. Marine Bancorporation,Inc. '1 the Court found that the
regulated nature of the banking industry precluded automatic application of antitrust rules developed in the conventional industry context. Also in the bank merger area, the Court suggested a redefinition
of geographic market analysis in United States v. Connecticut National Bank. 3
In each of these cases, the emerging antitrust majority of Chief
Justice Burger and Justices Stewart, Blackmun, Powell and Rehnquist was found on the prevailing side. Justices Douglas, Brennan
and Marshall were dissenters in every case except one. Justice
White was on the majority side in two out of the five cases. A change
in his position in any of the cases, however, would not have altered
the outcome."
The major antitrust decisions this past Term in all likelihood
provide the most accurate indication of the direction of antitrust law
in the near future. What the decisions demonstrate is that the era of
judicial expansion of the scope of antitrust law has come to a close.
I.
CONTROL OVER CLASS ACTIONS
Rule 23"1 was amended in 1966 in an effort to develop a reliable
mechanism for handling complex litigation involving a multiplicity
of parties. Under the current version," all class actions must satisfy
"

United States v. General Dynamics Corp., 415 U.S. 486 (1974).

,2418 U.S. 602 (1974).
"

418 U.S. 656 (1974).
Mr. Justice Douglas did not participate in the decision in the Marine

Bancorporationcase.
11Mr. Justice White was in the minority in General Dynamics (5-4), Marine
Bancorporation(5-3) and Connecticut Nat'l Bank (5-4), and in the majority in Eisen
(6-3) and Zahn (6-3).

, FED. R. Cv. P. 23.
" Original Rule 23 defined categories of class action based upon the character of
the right sought to be enforced for or against the class. These classes came to be known
as "true," "hybrid," and "spurious" class actions. Of most interest in the antitrust
context, the category of "spurious" class actions was comprised of cases in which a
form of permissive joinder was allowed. A major defect of this aspect of the Rule was
that it offered the opportunity of one-way intervention. See, e.g., Simon, ClassActions
UnderAmended Rule 23, 12 ANTrrrRusT BULL. 187 (1967); Symposium, Amended Federal Rule 23: Antitrust Class Actions, 32 ANrusT L.J. 251 (1966); Note, Proposed
Rule 23: ClassActions Reclassified, 51 VA. L. REv. 629 (1965).
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four requirements: (1) that the class is so numerous that joinder of
all members is impracticable, (2) that there are questions of law or
fact common to the class, (3) that the claims or defenses of the representative parties are typical of the claims or defenses of the class, and
(4) that the representative parties will fairly and adequately protect
the interests of the class.'" Most antitrust class actions must meet the
further standard, found in subdivision (b)(3), that permits the class
action to proceed if "the court finds that the questions of law or fact
common to the members of the class predominate over any questions
affecting only individual members, and that a class action is superior
to other available methods for the fair and efficient adjudication of
the controversy."' 9
Whether the purpose of the Rule, and particularly of subdivision
(b)(3), to achieve "economies of time, effort and expense, and promote uniformity of decision as to persons similarly situated ....
"10
has been realized is a subject of substantial controversy. On the one
hand the class action device has been characterized as "one of the
most socially useful remedies in history"'" and relied upon as "insuring that powerful product sellers confront an equally powerful adversary in the marketplace. 2 2 The contrary view is expressed by those
who attack class actions as a "Frankenstein monster"' and a device
not just "to solicit clients, but, more accurately, a device to conscript
them without their consent. ' 4 Major alterations of the Rule have
"FED. R. Civ. P. 23(a).
" FED. R. Civ. P. 23(b)(3). The Rule then lists considerations pertinent to a (b)(3)
determination:
(A) the interest of members of the class in individually contolling
the prosecution or defense of separate actions; (B) the extent and
nature of any litigation concerning the controversy already commenced by or against members of the class; (C) the desirability or
undepirability of concentrating the litigation of the claims in the particular forum; (D) the difficulties likely to be encountered in the management of a class action.
FED. R. Civ. P. 23 (b)(3).
Advisory Committee Note to the 1966 Amendment to Rule 23, 39 F.R.D. 69, 102
(1966).
21 Pomerantz, New Developments in ClassActions- Has Their Death Knell Been
Sounded?, 25 Bus. LAW. 1259 (1970).
2 Comment, Eisen III: Fluid Recovery, ConstructiveNotice and Payment of Notice Costs by Defendant in ClassAction Rejected, 73 COLUM. L. REv. 1641, 1660 (1973).
2 Eisen v. Carlisle & Jacquelin, 391 F.2d 555, 572 (2d Cir. 1968) (Lumbard, J.,
dissenting).
24 Pollock, Class Actions Reconsidered:Theory and PracticeUnderAmended Rule
23, 28 Bus. LAW. 741, 742 (1973) (emphasis in original).
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been proposed" and opposed.26
In the most recent Term the Supreme Court decided three cases
bearing on the class action remedy. 27 Of these, American Pipe &
ConstructionCo. v. Utah refused to restrict the usefulness of the class
action procedure as a means of tolling the statute of limitations with
regard to purported members of a class, even when the class action
is ultimately held to be inappropriate. The other cases, Eisen v. Carlisle & Jacquelin and Zahn v. InternationalPaper Co., reflect the new
majority's concern that class action procedures have been too expansively interpreted and that the risk of the federal judiciary's being
engulfed by wave after wave of enormous class suits pressed by enterprising attorneys is not too remote for consideration. Thus, the
Term's output in the class action area offers something both to the
proponents of an expansive use of Rule 23 and to the critics. But it is
the latter group whose views seem to have carried more weight.
Whether any significant limitations on class action procedures has
actually resulted is still open to question.
An early indication of caution in the Supreme Court's treatment
28
of class actions was the decision in Zahn v. InternationalPaper Co.
Mr. Justice White, speaking for the six-man majority, ruled that in
a class action under Rule 23(b)(3) each plaintiff member of the class
must satisfy the jurisdictional amount, and any plaintiff who fails
must be dismissed from the case.2 9 Although not an antitrust
case-and indeed not directly relevant to cases brought under § 1337,
which is one of the areas of federal jurisdiction exempted from the
jurisidictional amount requirements 2 -the decision nevertheless
clearly indicates that the Court is not searching for ways to broaden
the sweep of the class procedure.
21See, e.g., Handler, The Shift from Substantive to ProceduralInnovations in
Antitrust Suits-The Twenty-Third Annual Antitrust Review, 71 COLUM. L. Rlv. 1
(1971).
28 Kohn, The Antitrust Class Action as a Social Instrument, 41 ANTTRUST L.J. 288
(1972).
2 Eisen v. Carlisle & Jacquelin, 417 U.S. 156 (1974); American Pipe & Construction Co. v. Utah, 414 U.S. 538 (1974); Zahn v. International Paper Co., 414 U.S. 291
(1973).
- 414 U.S. 291 (1973).
"Burger, C.J., and Stewart, Blackmun, Powell and Rehnquist, JJ., joined in the
opinion of the Court. Brennan, J., filed a dissenting opinion in which Douglas and
Marshall, JJ., joined.
30 See 28 U.S.C. §§ 1333-34, 1336-40, 1343-45, 1347-58, 1361-62 (1970). The question naturally occurs whether, with so many areas of exemption, decisions limiting
class actions for failure to meet the jurisdictional amount will have much impact on
the federal court system. See Snyder v. Harris, 394 U.S. 332, 341 (1969).
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Plaintiffs, owners of property fronting on Lake Champlain,
brought an action on behalf of a class consisting of themselves and
200 lake-front property owners and lessees seeking damages from the
International Paper Company for discharges from a pulp and paper
plant causing water pollution in the lake and damaging the value of
surrounding property.3 The district court found that the claim of
each of the named plaintiffs satisfied the $10,000 jurisdictional
amount, but was dubious that every individual owner in the class had
suffered pollution damages in excess of the jurisdictional amount.
2
Consequently, on the authority of Snyder v. Harris,"
the district
court reasoned that it would not feasible to define a class of property
owners with claims of more than $10,000. Accordingly, it refused to
permit the suit to proceed as a class action.n A divided Court of
Appeals affirmed34 and the Supreme Court granted the petition for a
writ of certiorari."
In a broad-ranging opinion the Supreme Court affirmed. Justice
White first recited the familiar history of the "matter in controversy"
requirement. The Court showed that since at least 1832 it has been
a rule of interpretation that multiple plaintiffs with separate and
distinct claims must each satisfy the jurisdictional-amount requirement.37 The opinion then reiterated the Snyder principle that Rule
23, as amended in 1966, had not effected any change in the meaning
or application of the jurisdictional-amount requirement in class action cases. Because none of the plaintiffs in Snyder alleged a claim
exceeding $10,000, that class action did not survive a motion to dismiss. In Zahn, those plaintiffs without the jurisdictional amount ac31 The suit was brought as a diversity action under 28 U.S.C. § 1332 (1970). The
language of the Court, however, expressly included the jurisdictional-amount requirement in the general federal-question jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1331 (1970).
32 394 U.S. 332 (1969).
53 F.R.D. 430 (D. Vt. 1971).
34469 F.2d 1033 (2d Cir. 1972).
410 U.S. 925 (1973).
u The jurisdictional amount in diversity suits under § 11 of the First Judiciary
Act of 1789 was $500. 1 Stat. 78. In 1801, the requirement was lowered to $400, 2 Stat.
89, 92, but it was restored to $500 the following year. 2 Stat. 132. The jurisdictional
amount requirement remained fixed at the $500 level until 1887 when it was raised to
$2,000. 24 Stat. 552. The current jurisdictional amount was enacted into law in 1958.

72 Stat. 415. The legislative history demonstrates the intention to set the amount of
a level not "so high as to convert the federal courts into courts of big business nor so
low as to fritter away their time in a trial of petty controversies." S. RP. No. 1830,
85th Cong., 2d Sess. 3-4 (1958).
3 Oliver v. Alexander, 31 U.S. (6 Pet.) 143 (1832). Where several plaintiffs unite
to enforce a single right, in which they have a common and undivided interest, their
claims may be aggregated to qualify. See Troy Bank v. G.A. Whitehead & Co., 222
U.S. 39 (1911).
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cordingly were dismissed from the case, even though others had alleged jurisdictionally sufficient claims.
The Court was not inclined to overrule Snyder, nor to change its
rule of interpretation concerning the "matter in controversy" requirement of § 1332. The majority held that a rule of such long standing
which had remained undisturbed by Congress should not be altered
simply on the basis of speculative allegations of the intended effects
of the 1966 amendments:
It also seems to us that the application of the
jurisdictional-amount requirement to class actions was so
plainly etched in the federal courts prior to 1966 that had there
been any thought of departing from these decisions and, in so
doing, of calling into question the accepted approach to cases
involving ordinary joinder of plaintiffs with separate and distinct claims, some express statement of that intention would
surely have appeared, either in the amendments themselves or
in the official commentaries. But we find not a trace to this
effect. As the Court thought in Snyder v. Harris, the matter
must rest there absent further congressional action. 8
Mr. Justice Brennan's dissent noted that the jurisdictional
amount provision of § 1332(a) applied to "civil actions" and not
necessarily to individual claims in such actions. He argued that once
jurisdiction has attached to the action, in this case by means of at
least one plaintiff's seeking more than the statutory amount, the
remaining claims may be entertained on the theory of ancillary jurisdiction. The dissent pointed out that ancillary jurisdiction to achieve
litigation efficiency is in line with the principles governing the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure and has been used in many contexts to
consider claims that do not fit within the aggregation rules." Particu414 U.S. at 302 (footnote omitted).
3, See Wichita R.R. & Light Co. v. Public Util. Comm'n, 260 U.S. 48 (1922);
Phelps v. Oaks, 117 U.S. 236 (1886); Freeman v. Howe, 65 U.S. (24 How.) 450 (1861).
The opinion points out that the exercise of ancillary jurisdiction has been sanctioned
by the Supreme Court in cases involving compulsory counterclaims. Horton v. Liberty
Mutual Ins. Co., 367 U.S. 348 (1961), aft 275 F.2d 148 (5th Cir. 1960); Moore v. New
York Cotton Exchange, 270 U.S. 593 (1926) (intervention as of right under Rule 24(a));
Phelps v. Oaks, supra (cross claims under Rule 13(g)); R.M. Smythe & Co. v. Chase
Nat'l Bank, 291 F.2d 721 (2d Cir. 1961); Childress v. Cook, 245 F.2d 798 (5th Cir. 1957)
(impleaded defendants under Rule 14), Pennsylvania R.R. Co. v. Erie Ave. Warehouse
Co., 302 F.2d 843 (3d Cir. 1962); (defendants interpleaded under Rule 22); Walmac
Co. v. Isaacs, 220 F.2d 108 (1st Cir. 1955). See Developments in the Law-Multiparty
Litigationin the FederalCourts,71 HARv. L. Rav. 874passim (1958). See also 7 WRmoiG
& MILER, FEDERAL PRAcTICE & PRocmURE § 1756 (1972).
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larly because the district court had been unable to define a class of
plaintiffs who satisfied the jurisdictional amount, which resulted in
dismissal of the entire suit, Mr. Justice Brennan felt that the limitation imposed by the majority opinion on the class action procedure
was unnecessary and unduly restrictive.
The importance of this opinion for the antitrust student is its
implications for the antitrust class action. Although not required to
meet the jurisdictional-amount standards found in the diversity of
citizenship and general federal question jurisdiction areas, class action plaintiffs in antitrust cases are subject to various requirements
of the Rule, stated in general terms and therefore subject to interpretation. Questions of numerosity under subdivision (a)(1), representativeness of the claims under subdivision (a) (3), adequacy of representation under subdivision (a) (4) and other similar standards may be
interpreted restrictively or broadly, depending upon the orientation
of the court involved. Zahn is interesting, therefore, because it demonstrates the Supreme Court's willingness to accede to a denial of
federal court access for certain kinds of class actions. In short, the
Supreme Court, as currently composed, is not willing to adopt a rule
of law simply because claims may not otherwise be adjudicated. Of
course, in Zahn itself, if the class members who can satisfy the
jurisdictional-amount standard are few enough, the action can proceed under the rules of joinder.40 Those unable to reach the
jurisdictional-amount standard will be relegated to whatever remedies the state makes available, if any. Thus, the major significance
of the decision lies in what it reflects of the Court's intention to
maintain a tighter check on the reach of Rule 23.11
The promise of Zahn was borne out in the most important case
the Court decided last Term dealing with class actions, Eisen v.
42
Carlisle& Jacquelin.
That decision, by regulating the adequacy and
type of notice and by charging the plaintiff with the responsibility for
providing such notice, threw doubt on the viability of massive class
actions.
Morton Eisen was an odd-lot trader on the New York Stock
Exchange.4" In May 1966, he filed a class action on behalf of himself
0 FED. R. Civ. P. 20.
' Zahn is also interesting because it may have revived the "true," "hybrid" and
"spurious" categories of former Rule 23, thought to have been abandoned by the 1966
amendments, because of the necessity of determining the applicability of the "matter
in controversy" language of § 1332 or § 1331.
42417 U.S. 156 (1974).
0 Odd-lot traders deal in lots of shares fewer than 100. Shares are also frequently
sold in multiples of 100, or round lots.
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and other odd-lot traders on the New York Stock Exchange charging
two brokerage firms, which controlled 99% of the odd-lot business,
with violations of the antitrust and securities laws. Specifically, the
complaint alleged that by illegally fixing the odd-lot differential44
charged to the investing public at an excessive level, the brokerage
firms had violated §§ 1 and 2 of the Sherman Act. 5 The complaint
also charged the New York Stock Exchange with failure to regulate
the differential for the protection of investors in violation of § 6 and
19 of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934.6 The complaint sought
treble damages, attorneys' fees and injunctive relief.
A complex series of procedural skirmishes ensued over the next
eight years. Initially, the district court dismissed the suit as a class
action." Eisen sought permission to appeal under 28 U.S.C. §
1292(b), but his motion was denied. 8 Thereafter, he moved to file an
appeal as of right under § 1291, but the respondents opposed the
motion on the grounds that the order appealed from was not final.
The Second Circuit Court of Appeals held that the denial of class
action status in this case was an appealable final order. 9 The court
reasoned that an appeal should be permitted of right since dismissal
of a class action in this case was the "death knell" for the entire
action, and accordingly, under the reasoning of Cohen v. Beneficial
IndustrialLoan Corp.,S"rendered the order appealable.

The Court of Appeals then reversed the dismissal of the class
action.' It found the district court's action "too summary, holding
that improper standards had been applied and inadequate consideration given to the specific requirements of amended Rule 23."2 As a
result, the Second Circuit directed that a full evidentiary hearing be
held:
" The odd-lot differential is a surcharge imposed on the odd-lot investor in addition to the standard brokerage commission applicable to round-lot transactions. For

the period in question the differential was one-eighth of a point (121/2 cents) per share

on stocks trading below $40 per share and one-quarter of a point (25 cents) per share
on stocks trading at or above $40 per share. 417 U.S. at 157.
, 15 U.S.C. §§ 1 and 2 (1970).
4' 15 U.S.C. §§ 78f and 78aa (1970).
4741 F.R.D. 147 (S.D.N.Y. 1966).
" Under 28 U.S.C. § 1292 (1970), appeals may be taken to courts of appeals of

certain interlocutory orders on a discretionary basis, whereas § 1291 gives courts of
appeals jurisdiction of appeals from all "final" decisions of district courts.
11Eisen v. Carlisle & Jacquelin, 370 F.2d 119 (2d Cir. 1966), cert. denied, 386 U.S.

1035 (1967) [hereinafter cited as Eisen I].
- 337 U.S. 541 (1949).

51391 F.2d 555 (2d Cir.1968) [hereinafter cited as Eisen Ill.
52 479 F.2d 1005, 1007 (2d Cir. 1973) [hereinafter cited as Eisen III].
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Accordingly, the order appealed from is reversed; we retain
jurisdiction, and the case is remanded for a prompt and expeditious evidentiary hearing, with or without discovery proceedings, on the questions of notice, adequate representation, effective administration of the action and any other matters which
3
the District Court may consider pertinent and proper.1
Based on its findings on remand," the district court held that the
suit was maintainable as a class action . 5 First, the court found that
the plaintiff could adequately represent the class, in that his claim
typified those of the class, his lawyer was well qualified and there was
no danger of a collusive suit." Next, the court concluded that the
action was manageable. Although the problem of proving and awarding damages in connection with so large a class was substantial, the
adoption of a "fluid class" recovery significantly reduced the manageability problems. 57
The court then turned its attention to the problem of notice to
so large a class. Concluding that neither Rule 23(c)(2)" s nor the due
0 391 F.2d at 570.

" In brief, the court found that approximately 6 million shareholders had odd-lot
transactions during the period from May 1962 through June 1966 in stocks listed on
the Exchange; that during the same period the typical buyer or seller of odd-lots had
approximately five transactions on the Exchange, and the average odd-lot differential
per transaction was approximately $5.18; that of the approximately six million shareholders with such transactions in stocks listed on the Exchange, the names and addresses of at least one-third could be identified through the use of computer tapes and
the names and addresses of the remainder could not be identified with "reasonable
effort;" that an additional 250,000 persons who had invested through monthly investment plans and payroll deduction plans could be identified through the use of comI'puter tapes; and that the cost of stuffing a single-page printed notice and mailing it
with first class domestic postage would be 10 cents per letter, irrespective of the
number of letters to be sent.
52 F.R.D. 253 (S.D.N.Y. 1971).
5

Id. at 261.

Under the "fluid class" recovery concept, the damages of the entire class would
be determined in gross without having individual claims filed by each class member.
With such a fund established, claims could be administratively processed to return
damages to individuals, and the remainder could be devoted to any of several beneficial purposes. The court suggested that one possible use to which the residue could be
put was the reduction of the future cost of odd-lot buying and selling. Id at 265. On
"fluid class actions," see, e.g., Note, Managing the Large Class Action: Eisen v. Carlisle & Jacquelin, 87 HARv. L. REv. 426, 446-54 (1973); Note, Eisen III: Fluid Recovery,
Constructive Notice and Payment of Notice Costs by Defendant in Class Action
Rejected, 73 COLUM. L. REV. 1641 (1973).
8 Rule 23(c)(2) provides in pertinent part:
...The notice shall advise each member that (A) the court will
exclude him from the class if he so requests by a specified date; (B)
"
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process clause required the substantial expenditure approaching
$300,000 to give individual notice to all identifiable class members,
the court devised a notification scheme consisting of individual and
published notices. Specifically, the court proposed individual notice
to all member firms of the Exchange, the commercial banks with
large trust departments, the approximately 2,000 identifiable class
members who had at least ten transactions during the relevant period, and an additional 5,000 class members selected at random. It
further proposed large advertisments published twice in five newspapers in three cities. The cost of this program was estimated by the
court to be approximately $21,720.19
To determine who should pay the cost of notice, since the plaintiff had repeatedly stated his refusal to bear the large cost involved
in notice in order to recover a small individual claim, the court decided to hold a preliminary hearing on the merits to serve as a basis
for allocation of the expenses of the notice." Following the preliminary hearing, or so-called "mini-hearing," the district court issued an
opinion' finding that the odd-lot defendants had fixed the differential in 1951, that this was a per se violation of the antitrust laws and
that the Exchange was an active participant through its failure to
regulate it. Reasoning that the plaintiff was likely to prevail at trial
on the merits, the court ordered the defendants to pay 90% of the
notice costs, or $19,548.
On appeal, 2 the Second Circuit ruled that the suit could not
proceed as a class action." The court in essence held that individual
notice was required for all identificable class members under Rule
23(c)(2) and that the district court had no authority to conduct a
mini-hearing on the merits to allocate costs of notice. Accordingly,
the court decided that the entire expense of notice necessarily must
fall on the representative plaintiff. Rejecting the expedient of a "fluid
class" recovery, the court concluded that the proposed class action
was unmanageable under Rule 23(b) (3) (D), and thus ordered the suit
the judgment, whether favorable or not, will include all members who
do not request exclusion; and (C) any member who does not request
exclusion may, if he desires, enter an appearance through his counsel.
5' 52 F.R.D. at 263.
Id. at 270-72.

54 F.R.D. 565, 567 (S.D.N.Y. 1972).
Appeal was taken pursuant to the jurisdiction retained by the Court of Appeals
in its 1968 decision (Eisen i) and on independent grounds pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §
1291 (1970).
479 F.2d 1005 (2d Cir. 1973) (EisenHI).
"

IS

"

Id. at 1020.
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dismissed as a class action. Requests for rehearing and rehearing en
banc were denied 4
A not-quite-united Supreme Court affirmed.6 5 At the outset, the
Court treated the question of the jurisdiction of the Court of Appeals
to review the district court's order permitting the suit to proceed as
a class action and allocating the cost of notice. The Court found that
the order in question constituted a final decision within the meaning
of 28 U.S.C. § 1291,66 and was therefore appealable of right." As to
questions of finality which require the balancing of competing considerations-"the inconvenience and costs of piecemeal review on the
one hand and the danger of denying justice by delay on the
other" 6S-the Supreme Court decided that in this instance its decision was controlled by Cohen v. Beneficial Industrial Loan Corp."5
Like the order in Cohen, the lower court had conclusively rejected
respondents' contention that they could not lawfully be required to
bear the expense of notice to the proposed class. Furthermore, the
order involved a collateral matter not directly related to the merits
of the petitioner's claim. In short, it was a final disposition of a claim
of right which was not "an ingredient of the cause of action and [did]
not require consideration with it." ° Accordingly, in Eisen IV the
" The opinion was written by Powell, J., joined by Burger, C.J., Stewart, White,
Blackmun and Rehnquist, JJ. Douglas, J., with whom Brennan and Marshall, JJ.,
concurred, dissented in part.
66 § 1291 provides:
The court of appeals shall have jurisdiction of appeals from all
final decisions of the district courts of the United States, the United
States District Court for the District of the Canal Zone, the District
Court of Guam, and the District Court of the Virgin Islands, except
where direct review may be had in the Supreme Court.
28 U.S.C. § 1291 (1970).
6TThe Court therefore did not discuss the express retention of jurisdiction by the
court of appeals in Eisen III.
" Dickerson v. Petroleum Conversion Corp., 338 U.S. 507, 511 (1950) (footnote
omitted).
69 337 U.S. 541 (1949). In Cohen, the Supreme Court held appealable a trial court
order ruling inapplicable a state statute governing the allocation of expenses of a
stockholder's derivative action in a federal diversity case. The Court found, first, that
the lower court's conclusion was sufficiently complete to settle the corporation's claim
that it was entitled by state law to require the shareholder to post security for costs
and, second, that the decision concerned a collateral matter that could not be reviewed
effectively on appeal from the final judgment. In short, the decision was one that
finally determined "claims of rights separable from and collateral to, rights asserted
in the action, too important to be denied review and too independent of the cause itself
to require that appellate consideration be deferred until the whole case is adjudicated."
Id. at 546.
10Id. at 546-47.
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Supreme Court concluded that the Court of Appeals had jurisdiction
to review the lower court's resolution of the class action notice problems.
Turning to the merits, the Supreme Court first ruled that the
district court's resolution of the notice problem failed to comply with
the requirements of Rule 23(c)(2). The Court relied upon the language of the Rule requiring "individual notice to all members who
can be identified through a reasonable effort." Mr. Justice Powell
found his conclusion conifirmed both by the Advisory Committee's
Note 7' and the due process standards elaborated in Mullane v. Central Hanover Bank & Trust Co. 72 Holding that publication notice
could not satisfy the requirements of due process where the names
and addresses of the persons to be notified were known, the Court
stated in Mullane that the method used must be reasonably certain
to give notice:
But when notice is a person's due, process which is a mere
gesture is not due process. The means employed must be such
as one desirous of actually informing the absentee might reasonably adopt to accomplish it. The reasonableness and hence
the constitutional validity of any chosen method may be defended on the ground that it is in itself reasonably certain to
inform those affected . . .73
The Court was unimpressed with the contention of the petitioner
that the requirement of individual notice in this case should be abandoned. As to the prohibitive cost of providing individual notice to
more than two million class members, the Court replied that individual notice to identifiable class members is not a discretionary matter
which can be waived in a particular case. The Court disagreed with
71 See 39 F.R.D. 98 et seq. (1966).

72 339 U.S. 306 (1950). See also, Schroeder v. City of New York, 371 U.S. 208
(1962).
1 339 U.S. at 315. The Court discussed the inadequacies of published notice:
It would be idle to pretend that publication alone, as prescribed here,
is a reliable means of acquainting interested parties of the fact that
their rights are before the courts . . . . Chance alone brings to the
attention of even a local resident an advertisement in small type inserted in the back pages of a newspaper, and if he makes his home
outside the area of the newspaper's normal circulation the odds that
the information will never reach him are large indeed. The chance of
actual notice is further reduced when, as here, the notice required does
not even name those whose attention it is supposed to attract, and
does not inform acquaintances who might call it to attention.
339 U.S. at 315.
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petitioner's argument that adequate representation, rather than notice, is the substance of the due process requirement in a class action.
Not only did the argument run counter to the words of Rule 23 but it
led in the end to the conclusion that no notice at all, published or
otherwise, was required. The Court therefore concluded that Rule
23(c)(2) requires that individual notice be sent to all class members
who can be identified with reasonable effort.
Mr. Justice Powell also agreed with the Second Circuit that the
plaintiff must bear the cost of notice to the members of his class.
Finding nothing in the language or history of Rule 23 that gives any
court the authority to conduct a preliminary inquiry into the merits
of a class action suit, the Court concluded that a mini-hearing was
directly contrary to the command of subdivision (c) (1) 71 that a court
determine "as soon as practicable after the commencement of [the]
action . . ." whether a suit was maintainable as a class action. The
Court was clearly fearful of prejudicing the defendant in such a preliminary determination of the merits, since rules of evidence and
procedures applicable to civil trials would not then be applicable. Yet
the tentative findings of the court might well color subsequent proceedings and lead perhaps to unfair pressure to settle.
Because the petitioner had consistently maintained that he would
not bear the cost of notice, the Court remanded the case with instructions to dismiss the class action. Nevertheless, in a footnote, the
Court left the way open for the definition of a class sufficiently small
that the petitioner would be willing to pay the cost of notice to its
5
members.7
Mr. Justice Douglas' dissent, focusing on the potential for designating smaller subclasses, argued that such a result could properly
be accomplished by order of the district court without amendment
of the complaint as filed. In his view, to permit the district court the
widest flexibility in altering or modifying the class composition during the development of the case for trial, it would have been preferable to leave the full class complaint in existence.
Eisen IV is a major blow to actions on behalf of large, amorphous
classes whose members can nevertheless be identified with reasonable effort. The requirement of individual notice and the direction that
the plaintiff must bear the expense of that notice is a major obstacle
for any plaintiff to confront at the outset of a class action. Nevertheless, the ingenuity of lawyers and the fact that the Supreme Court
declined to reach all of the class action issues raised in Eisen LI make
"

FED. R. Civ. P. 23(c)(1).

417 U.S. at 179 n.16.
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certain that all of these issues will continue to be reviewed in courts
across the land.
For instance, the Court ruled that a preliminary evidentiary hearing on the merits was impermissible to determine the allocation of
expenses for notification of class members. On the face of it, such a
position seems eminently sensible. Since the plaintiff initiates the
action, it seems rational to require that the plaintiff likewise bear the
necessary expense of putting his case into shape for trial. In addition,
Rule 23 nowhere authorizes a "mini-hearing," and moreover the entire procedure's potential for prejudicing a court seems undeniable.
Nevertheless it may be impossible to avoid probirig the merits of
a case in determination of the class action issues required under Rule
23(c). It has been assumed that an evidentiary hearing on pure Rule
23 questions, including discovery, live witnesses and the presentation
of other evidence, is necessary to assess fully such problems as the
manageability of a class action, whether the common issues of law are
in fact predominant, and the like. Thus, despite Eisen IV's dictates,
it seems unlikely that some inquiry into the merits of a class action
can be avoided." -Although not specifically authorized in Rule 23, the
oft-repeated necessity for flexibility in using the Rule77 seemingly
endows the courts with the capacity to hold a preliminary hearing if
it is required for the efficient conduct of an action. Assuming the
effort is to avoid the arbitrary allocation of the expense of notice, it
can hardly be denied that a preliminary hearing is thus less likely to
be wholly arbitrary than the automatic imposition of costs on one
party or the other. In light of this consideration, the Court could have
rationalized the need for a preliminary hearing in terms of the necessity to make the rule workable, even though the device is not expressly
authorized in Rule 23. That the Court has declined to do so is one
more piece of evidence that it seeks to confine the class action remedy
within a somewhat limited scope.
Perhaps it was most influenced by the potential for prejudice. It
is difficult to see how the district court in Eisen could have come to
a full trial on the merits without being influenced by the residual
effect of its findings on the probability of success. While a court might
7, Indeed, the holding of Eisen IV on the preliminary hearing issue may prove
ultimately to be of greater advantage to plaintiffs who desire to postpone analysis of
the merits of the case in order to achieve class certification in the interests of improving
their settlement leverage. No doubt courts will be compelled, therefore, to resist defendants' suggestion that the merits of the case be analyzed. See, e.g., Professional Adjusting Systems v. General Adjustment Bureau, Inc., 1974-2 Trade Cases 75,183
(S.D.N.Y. 1974).

n See, e.g.,

MANUAL FOR COMPLEX LITIGATION §

1.43 at 15 (1973).
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take steps to erase the formal results of such a hearing, one other
aspect of preliminary hearings, the increased settlement leverage, is
reason enough to avoid them. While it can be argued that a correct
evaluation of the merits should lead to a realisitic assessment of the
chances of success in the litigation by both parties in the context of
settlement discussions, the whole point of the Court's concern is that
in a truncated preliminary hearing, without the traditional procedures in an adversary proceeding, the trial court's analysis of the case
will too closely resemble a throw of the dice. Further, assuming the
non-appealability of a preliminary hearing opinion, the result for the
losing party could be devastating. If the defendant loses the hearing
and pays notice costs, it will likely be unable to recover those costs
even in the event it subsequently is vindicated after trial on the
merits. Of course, if instead of payment of the notice costs, it settles
even though it has a strong case, the result is prejudicial.
Finally, the Court, always concerned with the burdens on the
judicial system, may have apprehended that the addition of another
stage in the proceedings, serving only to resolve a collateral issue at
great expense of resources, is in the final analysis simply not worthwhile. The mini-hearing is presumably designed to permit survival of
those cases in which the plaintiff class is likely to prevail on the
merits but the class representative can neither afford nor collect the
expense of notice. The number of such cases may simply have appeared to the Supreme Court too small to justify the imposition of
additional burdens upon an already overburdened judicial system in
every class action case. Weighing the few cases that the mini-hearing
would save against the fundamentally defective nature of the hearing
itself, its potential for prejudice in every class action and the waste
of judicial resources that will be the result in many cases, the Court
undoubtedly felt justified in paring down the number of large class
actions that would otherwise have had access to the courts.
It is important to realize that the Supreme Court did not directly
address the issues of "fluid class" recovery and manageability of large
class actions. One possible interpretation of Eisen IV is that by vacating the judgment of the Court of Appeals, it has excised the hostile
language of Eisen III toward fluid class recoveries which indicated
that a suit on behalf of a six million member class is unmanageable."5

78 Mr. Justice Powell expressly refused to consider these issues, 417 U.S. at 172
n.10, and affirmed only those parts of Eisen HI dealing with notice and the preliminary
"mini-hearing" on the merits.
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At least one case, however, has rejected fluid recovery on the basis
that the Supreme Court in Eisen IV left standing the Court of Appeals opinion dealing with the impropriety of fluid class recoveries. 9
The fluid class recovery is clearly not expressly authorized by
statute or by any of the federal rules. It represents an innovative
mechanism for distributing funds which have been gained illegally.
Whether such a device is to be permitted by the Supreme Court must
await final decision in another case.
While the decisions in Zahn and Eisen may prove discouraging to
class action plaintiffs, American Pipe & Construction Co. v. Utah"
demonstrates that the Court is not hostile to class action procedures.
Speaking for an unanimous Court' Mr. Justice Stewart held that the
statute of limitations provided in the Clayton Act for antitrust suits
was tolled as to purported members of a class, even though subsequently the action might be held an improper class action. The
Court's decision reconciles the policy of the statute of limitations in
affording security to potential defendants against the filing of stale
claims with the contrasting policy underlying the class action rules
of avoiding a multiplicity of individual claims in favor of consolidated
litigation.
IA complicated chronology of events preceded the decision. A federal grand jury in March 1964 indicted a number of individuals and
companies for criminal violations of § 1 of the Sherman Act." The
indictments contained allegations of collusive and rigged bidding and
division and allocation of markets in restraint of trade in the steel and
concrete pipe industry. The defendants offered pleas of nolo
contendere and judgments of guilty were entered on the pleas on June
19, 1964. Almost immediately afterward, the United States filed civil
suits against the companies. After extended negotiations between the
government and the defendants, these suits were terminated by a
final judgment entered on May 24, 1968, in which the defendants
consented to a decree barring the specified violations of the antitrust
laws.
On May 13, 1969-eleven days short of a year later-the State of
Utah filed a treble damage suit against the same defendants on behalf of itself and a class of "public bodies and agencies of the state

7' Barnett & Son, Inc. v. Outboard Marine Corp., 1974-2 Trade Cases
97,630 n.15 (D. Del. 1974).
- 414 U.S. 548 (1974).
" Mr. Justice Blackmun filed a concurring opinion.
15 U.S.C. § 1 (1970).

79,293 at
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and local government in the State of Utah who are end users of pipe
acquired from the defendants." The suit alleged the same antitrust
violations as had been the subject of earlier litigation.
The action was filed before the running of the statute of limitations contained in the Clayton Act" which also provides for tolling
during the pendency of any suit instituted by the United States and
for one additional year after thd termination of such suit. 4 The action
was thus filed with eleven days to spare before the end of the permitted one year following the termination of the government's civil action by the consent decree entered on May 24, 1968.85
In November of 1969, the defendants moved for an order pursuant to Rule 23(c)(1)88 that the suit could not be maintained as a class
action. In granting the motion, the court found that most of the
prerequisites to a class action contained in Rule 23(a) 7 were met, but
that the numerosity requirement was not satisfied. The complaint
alleged that the members of the class totalled more than 800, but the
court, having participated in earlier litigation involving the same
defendants and related causes of action, decided that the number of
entities likely to qualify for recovery was in fact far lower and that
13 Section 4B, 15 U.S.C. § 15b (1970), provides in pertinent part: "Any action to
enforce any cause of action [under the antitrust laws] shall be forever barred unless
commenced within four years after the cause of action accrued. ..."
Section 5(b) of the Clayton Act, 15 U.S.C. § 16(b) (1970) provides:
Whenever any civil or criminal proceeding is instituted by the United
States to prevent, restrain or punish violations of any of the antitrust

laws, .

.

. the running of the statute of limitations in respect of every

private right of action arising under said laws and based in whole or
in part on any matter complained of in said proceeding shall be suspended during the pendency thereof and for one year thereafter:
Provided,however, That whenever the running of the statute of limitations in respect of a cause of action arising under section 15 ... is

suspended hereunder, any action to enforce such cause of action shall
be forever barred unless commenced either within the period of suspension or within four years after the cause of action accrued.
81An earlier argument by the defendants that the tolling period provided by § 5(b)
should have begun to run from the termination of the criminal proceedings in June,
1964, was rejected in Maricopa County v. American Pipe & Constr. Co., 303 F. Supp.
77 (D. Ariz. 1969), and was not renewed in the Utah litigation.
Subparagraph (c)(1) of Rule 23 provides:
As soon as practicable after the commencement of an action brought
as a class action, the court shall determine by order whether it is to
be so maintained. An order under this subdivision may be conditional,
and may be altered or amended before the decision on the merits.
FED. R. Civ. P. 23 (c)(1).
9 See text accompanying note 18 supra.
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joinder was therefore practicable." Eight days after the entry of the
order denying class action status, over 60 towns, municipalities and
water districts in the State of Utah, all of whom had been claimed
as members of the original class, filed motions to intervene as plaintiffs in Utah's action under Rule 24(a)(2) as of right, or, in the alternative, under Rule 24(b)(2) by permission.89
The district court denied the motion in all respects on the grounds
that the limitations period provided by § 4B of the Clayton Act, as
tolled by § 5(b), had run as to the movants and had not been further
tolled by the institution of the class action on their behalf." On appeal, the Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit affirmed as to the
denial of leave to intervene as of right, but reversed as to the denial
of permission to intervene.9 The court decided that suit was actually
commenced by Utah's filing even as to purported class members who
" 49 F.R.D. 17 (C.D. Cal. 1969). The suit had been transferred from Utah to the
United States District Court for the Central District of California by the Judicial Panel
on Multidistrict Litigation because Judge Martin Pence, Chief Judge of the District
of Hawaii sitting in the California District by assignment, had participated in the more
than 100 actions arising out of the same factual situation concentrated in'that District.
303 F. Supp. 607 (J.P.M.L. 1969).
" Rule 24 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure provides in pertinent part as
follows:
(a) Intervention of Right. Upon timely application anyone shall be
permitted to intervene in an action: (1) when a statute of the United
States confers an unconditional right to intervene; or (2) 'when the
applicant claims an interest relating to the property or transaction
which is the subject of the action and he is so situated that the disposition of the action may as a practical matter impair or impede his
ability to protect that interest, unless the applicant's interest is adequately represented by existing parties.
(b) Permissive Intervention. Upon timely application anyone may
be permitted to intervene in an action: (1) when a statute of the
United States confers a conditional right to intervene; or (2) when an
applicant's claim or defense and the main action have a question of
law or fact in common. When a party to an action relies for ground of
claim or defense upon any statute or executive order administered by
a federal or state governmental officer or agency or upon any regulation, order, requirement or agreement issued or made pursuant to the
statute or executive order, the officer or agency upon timely application may be permitted to intervene in the action. In exercising its
discretion the court shall consider whether the intervention will unduly delay or prejudice the adjudication of the rights of the original
parties.
FPm. R. Civ. P. 24.
"Utah v. American Pipe & Constr. Co., 50 F.R.D. 99 (C.D. Cal. 1970).
, 473 F.2d 580 (9th Cir. 1973).
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subsequently were found not to qualify for class action treatment.
Certiorari was granted.2
The Supreme Court began its analysis by recalling the "one-way
intervention" problem with the earlier version of Rule 23 which permitted purported members of a class to await trial developments to
determine whether continued participation would be favorable to
their interests." Whatever might have been the views of the courts
as to intervention by members of a "spurious" class after the termination of a limitation, the majority found little to puzzle over in
American Pipe. The Court found that a class action under the current
version of Rule 23 is a "truly representative suit" with the purpose
of avoiding, rather than encouraging, the unnecessary filing of suit
papers. Such a purpose would hardly be satisfied by requiring protective suits by purported class members who are in danger of losing
their class status.
Thus, the commencement of the action satisfied the purpose
of the limitations provision as to all those who might subsequently participate in the suit as well as for the named plaintiffs. To hold to the contrary would frustrate the principal
function of a class suit, because then the sole means by which
members of the class could assure their participation in the
judgment if notice of the class suit did not reach them until
after the running of the limitation period would be to file
earlier individual motions to join or intervene as parties
-precisely the multiplicity of activity which Rule 23 was
designed to avoid in those cases where class action is found
"superior to other available methods for the fair and efficient
adjudication of the controversy." Rule 23(b)(3).1
The Court therefore held that where a class action has been denied solely because of failure to demonstrate that the class is so
numerous as to make joinder impracticable, the commencement of
the original suit tolls the statute of limitations for all purported class
members who make timely motions to intervene after the denial of
class action status. In the Supreme Court's view, statutory limitation
411 U.S. 963 (1973).
Original Rule 23 contained no device for determining at any point in advance
of final judgment which members of the claimed class would be bound thereby. The
amendments to the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure in 1966 were in part designed to
cure this defect and insure that members of the class would be identified at an early
stage and thus subjected to the binding effect of final judgment. See Advisory Committee's Note, 39 F.R.D. 98, 105-06 (1966).
1 414 U.S. at 551.
92
3
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periods were designed to prevent surprises through the "revival of
claims that have been allowed to slumber until evidence has been
lost, memories have faded, and witnesses have disappeared." 5 But
in American Pipe no plaintiff had slept on his rights and the defendants were not prejudiced by lack of warning as to the number and
identities of potential plaintiffs who might participate in the judgement. As a result, because imposition of the statute of limitations
period deadline would not have served the purpose of the statute of
limitations, the interpretation of Rule 23 adopted by the Court was
necessary to insure the efficiency and economy that amended Rule
23 was intended to achieve.
With respect to the argument that, regardless of the policies underlying Rule 23 and the statute of limitations, federal courts are
powerless to extend a limitation period because of its substantive
element, the Court concluded that judicial power to toll a statute of
limitations does not constitute an abridgment or modification of a
substantive right. Indeed, the legislative history of §§ 4B and 5(b) of
the Clayton Act demonstrates that during debate members of the
House Judiciary Committee left no doubt that the amendment was
"strictly a procedural limitation and [had] nothing to do with substance."" The Court therefore concluded that a provision in a federal statute for substantive liability which also sets a time limitation
upon the institution of the suit does not necessarily restrict the power
of the federal courts to hold that the statute of limitations is tolled
under certain circumstances not inconsistent with the legislative purpose.
Finally, the Court decided that the decision to deny permission
to intervene was not discretionary, involving as it did a finding that
the prospective intervenors were absolutely barred by the statute of
limitations. Such conclusions of law were subject to review by the
appellate courts, and consequently the Ninth Circuit had not erred
in reversing the decision to exclude the intervenors. Because they had
filed their motions to intervene within the appropriate period, the
motions were timely and the judgment of the Court of Appeals was
in all respects affirmed.
In analyzing American Pipe, one question of primary importance
is whether it is ever proper for a legislatively imposed statute of
limitations to be tolled by a court. In American Pipe the trial court
was persuaded by the defendants' contentions that the Federal Rules
15Order of R.R. Telegraphers v. Railway Express Agency, Inc., 321 U.S. 342, 34849 (1944).
" 414 U.S. at 558 n.29.
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of Civil Procedure could never "abridge, enlarge or modify any substantive rights ....
,,"7 The court accordingly denied leave to intervene on the basis of its conclusion that the tolling of § 5(b) by a class
action proceeding, ultimately not maintainable, constituted an
abridgment of substantive rights. On the other hand, the Supreme
Court adopted the concept of consistency with the legislative scheme
as the focus of analysis. If tollifig of a federal statute of limitations is
"consonant with the legislative scheme," 8 the substantiveprocedural dichotomy becomes irrelevant.
Comparing the policies underlying Rule 23 with those behind the
statutes of limitations, the Court was fully justified in concluding
that the major purposes served by the statute of limitations are not
violated by permitting intervention in American Pipe. On the other
hand, to prohibit intervention and thus penalize purported class
members for initially pursuing their remedies through the class action device would do great violence to the viability of the class action
procedure. In effect, asserted class members would be required to file
individual suits in order to protect their rights before the expiration
of the statute of limitations, unless they could be assured that the
statute of limitations would be tolled even in the event the class
action was ultimately held not maintainable.
As to the latter point, the Supreme Court apparently went beyond
other federal courts. Thi Court declined the opportunity to toll the
statute of limitations and permit intervention only for those purported class members who had relied upon the existence of the class
action to preserve their rights." One other court had suggested the
more stringent rule that only in those cases where class action status
had been denied for "considerations of judicial housekeeping" should
purported class members be permitted to show their good faith reliance on the existence of the class to ensure the tolling of the statute
of limitations.' 0
If the basis upon which the Supreme Court declined the invitation
to restrict its holding was the efficiency of class action procedures
and the policy of avoiding a multiplicity of individual claims, then
it could have adopted the "good faith reliance" standard without
damaging these principles. Unless a purported class member is aware
of the class action, he will inevitably not be able to file an individual
28 U.S.C. § 2072 (1970).
414 U.S. at 557-58.
"Buford v. American Fin. Co., 333 F. Supp. 1243 (N.D. Ga. 1971).
11 Philadelphia Electric Co. v. Anaconda American Brass Co., 43 F.R.D. 452
(E.D. Pa. 1968).
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claim. And conceivably, by converting unaware purported class
members into potential intervenors, the Court may well have unnecessarily increased the settlement leverage against a defendant.
American Pipe, together with Zahn and Eisen, have thus introduced new questions into class action law, and the answers to these
new questions are difficult to predict. Zahn, and Eisen seem to be
consistent with the new antitrust majority's movement toward caution and away from expansion, but the result in AmericanPipe points
in the other direction. Apparently going beyond what would have
been required to fulfill the policies underlying Rule 23, the Court
framed a rule that avoids conversion of the class action procedure into
a trap for the unwary. Yet it may produce unjustfied additional pressures upon defendants to avoid litigation even when they can assert
meritorious defenses.
It appears that the Court is looking at each class action case very
carefully, taking into account the facts of the case and the basic
policies underlying Rule 23. The concepts of fairness for both parties
and the wear and tear upon the judicial system are also matters of
major importance to the Court in its consideration of class action
cases. Because class action issues thus far have been resolved mostly
in the lower federal courts, it is clear that the Supreme Court's authoritative interpretation of Rule 23 is just beginning to evolve.
H.
MERGERS AND MARKET DnFINITON-A NEw LOOK?

The second major antitrust area in which the Court seemed to be
taking a new direction last Term is the application of § 7 of the
Clayton Act.'"' Since the 1950 amendments to § 7 by the CellerKefauver Act, the government has encountered a nearly unbroken
string of victories in the Supreme Court. That string came to a halt
last Term with the decisions in United States v. GeneralDynamics
Corp., "I United States v. Marine Bancorporation,Inc. ,' ° and United
States v. Connecticut National Bank.'4
General Dynamics has a long history. In 1954, a large midwest
producer and supplier of building materials, concrete, limestone and
coal, Material Service Corporation, began to acquire the stock of
United Electric Coal Companies, strip miners in Illinois and Ken' 15 U.S.C. § 18 (1970). See note 106 infra.
1,2

415 U.S. 486 (1974).

10 418 U.S. 602 (1974).
1' 418 U.S. 656 (1974).
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tucky1 °5 In 1959, General Dynamics entered upon a diversification
program including the acquisition of Material Service. This purchase
made General Dynamics the nation's fifth largest commercial coal
producer. Eight years later, the government filed suit challenging the
acquisition of the stock of United Electric by Material Service and
its successor, General Dynamics. The § 7106 complaint alleged that the
acquisition substantially lessened competition in the production and
and the so-called
sale of coal in two geographical markets, 0Illinois
7
Eastern Interior Coal Province Sales area.
The district cour decided against the government on the three
major issues in the case: (1) the appropriate line of commerce; (2) the
proper section of the country; and (3) the probability of a lessening
of competition. As to the relevant product market, the trial court
refused to find that coal, by itself, defined the product market parameters. Instead, it held that because coal faces strong competition
from other energy sources, the "energy market" was the line of commerce in which the anticompetitive effects, if any, of the acquisition
could best be assessed. Similarly, the trial court refused to agree with
the government's proposed geographic market definitions, which it
felt were unduly tied to past and present production statistics and not
necessarily related to "actual coal consumption patterns." ' Rather,
the court concluded that the relevant geographic market was a number of smaller areas defined by the characteristics of the customers
"0 For five years Material Service purchased United Electric stock until its holdings amounted to more than 34% of the outstanding shares, a point at which all parties
to the litigation eventually agreed Material Service had effective control. Changes were
made in the corporate structure of United Electric at the behest of Material Service.
General Dynamics, after its purchase of Material Service, continued to acquire equity
in United Electric by direct purchases of stock, controlling approximately 66% by 1966.
In September of 1966 a tender offer to holders of the remaining United Electric stock
was successful and United Electric shortly thereafter became a wholly owned subsidiary of General Dynamics. 415 U.S. 486, 488-90 (1974).

10 Section 7 of the Clayton Act reads in pertinent part as follows:
No corporation engaged in commerce shall acquire, directly or indirectly, the whole or any part of the stock or other share capital and
no corporation subject to the jurisdiction of the Federal Trade Commission shall acquire the whole or any part of the assets of another
corporation engaged also in commerce, where in any line of commerce
in any section of the country, the effect of such acquisition may be
substantially to lessen competition, or tend to create a monopoly.
15 U.S.C. § 18 (1970).
"" That sales area is one of four major coal distribution areas recognized by the
coal industry and comprises Illinois and Indiana, and parts of Kentucky, Tennessee,
Iowa, Minnesota, Wisconsin, and Missouri. 415 U.S. at 490.
103United States v. General Dynamics Corp., 341 F. Supp. 534, 556 (N.D. Ill.
1972).
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and by the Interstate Commerce Commission freight rate districts.
Finally, the district court did not agree that the government's contention of anticompetitive effect had been proved. In its view, the decline
in the number of coal producers in the area resulted from the change
in the nature of demand for coal and not from anticompetitive acquisitions. Second, the court found the parties to the acquisition to be
complementary, in the sense that their mining methods were wholly
different. Third, the court found that for the most part the companies
were not competitive for the same customers and that United Electric's weak coal reserve position suggested the absence of market
power.
On appeal,' 9 the judgment of the district court was affirmed.
Writing for the majority,"'0 Mr. Justice Stewart embraced the district
court's analysis of anticompetitive effect but found it unnecessary to
consider market definition. The Court first analyzed the statistics
presented by the government to prove an increase of concentration.
The data demonstrated generally that the coal industry was concentrated among a small number of leading producers and that there was
a trend toward increasing concentration. For instance, the number of
coal-producing firms in Illinois decreased almost 73% during the period from 1957 to 1967, from 144 to 39. The statistics also showed that
the challenged acquisition had increased the share of the merged
company in the relevant markets.
The Court then reviewed the significance of aggregate statistics in
cases involving horizontal mergers. Against the background of the
legislative history of § 7, described in Brown Shoe Co. v. United
States"' as reflecting the "dominant theme pervading congressional
consideration of the 1950 amendments . . . [namely] a fear of what
was considered to be a rising tide of economic concentration in the
American economy,""' 2 the Court has relied heavily on a statistical
demonstration of increased concentration:
This intense congressional concern with the trend toward concentration warrants dispensing, in certain cases, with elaborate proof of market structure, market behavior, or probable
anticompetitive effects. Specifically, we think that a merger
I" The government appealed directly to the Supreme Court pursuant to the Expediting Act, 15 U.S.C. § 29 (1970). The Court noted probable jurisdiction. 409 U.S. 1058
(1973).
"I The majority consisted of Burger, C.J., Stewart, Blackmun, Powell and
Rehnquist, JJ. The dissent was written by Douglas, J., with Brennan, White and
Marshall, JJ., concurring in the dissent.
"' 370 U.S. 294 (1962).

"12Id. at 315.
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which produces a firm controlling an undue percentage share
of the relevant market, and results in a significant increase in
the concentration of firms in that market, is so inherently
likely to lessen competition substantially that it must be enjoined in the absence of evidence clearly showing that the
merger is not likely to have such anticompetitive effects."'
The Court agreed that the statistical showing offered by the government as evidence in the trial court would have sufficed under the
PhiladelphiaBank approach to support a finding of "undue concentration." The crucial question for the majority, however, was whether
the district court was justified in finding that other pertinent factors
affecting the coal industry and the business of the parties to the
acquisition led to a conclusion that § 7 had not been violated. In its
earlier merger decisions, including Brown Shoe, the Court considered
relevant any indicators of competitive effect beyond statistics:
• . .Congress indicated plainly that a merger had to be functionally viewed, in the context of its particular industry
114

Statistics reflecting the shares of the market controlled by the
industry leader and the parties to the merger are, of course, the
primary index of market power; but only a further examination
of the particular market-its structure, history and probable
future-can provide the appropriate setting for judging the
probable anticompetitive effect of the merger."4 .'
Accordingly, Mr. Justice Stewart examined that portion of the
district court's opinion devoted to a description of the changes that
have affected the coal industry since World War II. The trial court
concluded that coal was increasingly less able to compete with other
energy sources. With the decline of the railroads and increasingly stiff
competition from oil and natural gas, coal's share of the energy market in the United States fell from 78.4% in 1920 to 21.4% in 1968. In
addition, the Court recognized that while the electric utility industry
had become the mainstay of coal consumption, consuming in 1968
more than 59% of all the coal used in the country, the supply of coal
"3 United States v. Philadelphia Nat'l Bank, 374 U.S. 321, 363 (1963); see also
United States v. Von's Grocery Co., 384 U.S. 270 (1966); United States v. Pabst
Brewing Co., 384 U.S. 546 (1966); United States v. Continental Can Co., 378 U.S. 441
(1964).
"I Brown Shoe Co. v. United States, 370 U. S. 294, 321-22 (1962); see also United
States v. Continental Can Co., supra n.113.
".1'Brown Shoe Co. v. United States, 370 U.S. 294, 322 n.38 (1962).
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to utilities took place under long-term requirements contracts which
limit the amounts of coal available for "spot" purchases on the open
market. In light of these fundamental changes in the structure of the
coal market, the Supreme Court held that the district court was
justified in viewing the statistics presented by the government as
insufficient to prove its case.
The Court's thesis was based on the premise that evidence of past
production is not necessarily proof of future ability to compete. Of
course, in any industry in which distribution facilities and product
differentiation reflect market power, past sales as demonstrated by
market shares are assumed to be evidence of competitive position.
Thus, companies controlling large market shares are frequently prohibited from expanding by merger. In the coal market, however, as
analyzed by the trial court, statistical evidence of coal production
was thought to be of considerably less significance. Since it is true
that most of the coal produced is sold under long-term requirements
contracts, the focus of competition is not on the disposition of coal
already produced but on the procurement of new long-term supply
contracts.
In this situation, a company's past ability to produce is of
limited significance, since it is in a position to offer for sale
neither its past production nor the bulk of the coal it is presently capable of producing, which is typically already committed under a long-term supply contract. A more significant indicator of a company's power effectively to compete with other
companies lies in the state of a company's uncommitted reserves of recoverable coal."1 5
Thus, a company with relatively large supplies of coal not under
contract to a consumer has a stronger competitive position in the
negotiation of supply contracts than a firm with small reserves, even
though the latter may produce more coal.
Upon analyzing the coal reserves of United Electric, the Court
found them "unpromising." Although United ranked fifth among Illinois coal producers in terms of annual production, it was tenth in
reserve holdings and controlled less than 1% of the reserves held by
producers in Illinois, Indiana and Western Kentucky. The depleted
reserves had already forced the closing of some of its midwest mines.
In addition, of the more than 52 million tons of currently minable
reserves controlled by United, only 4 million tons were uncommitted
under long-term contracts. Thus, the picture was one of depleted
"I

United States v. General Dynamics Corp., 415 U.S. at 501-2.
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resources and an already obligated supply. Accordingly, United Electric was severely limited in its ability to compete for new long-term
contracts. This severe limitation, not reflected in the government's
statistics, substantiated the trial court's conclusion that the acquisition of United Electric would not substantially reduce competition.
The government argued that the lower court erred in giving undue
consideration to post-acquisition evidence. Mr. Justice Stewart conceded that in certain cases post-acquisition evidence has only limited
weight. Obviously events within the control of the merging companies
could be manipulated to suggest the absence of anticompetitive effect when a § 7 suit was threatened or pending. In addition, because
§ 7 speaks in probabilities and not certainties" 6 the fact that no
concrete anticompetitive symptoms occur in the interval between
acquisition and trial does not necessarily mean that no such symptoms will develop thereafter. Nevertheless, the Court decided that
post-acquisition evidence "tending to diminish the probability or
impact of anticompetitive effects might be considered in a § 7
case.""' 7 The trial court, however, had relied on evidence relating to
changes in the patterns and structure of the coal industry and of
United Electric's coal reserve situation, matters not within the control of the parties. Indeed these trends were exhibited throughout the
coal industry in all parts of the country. Unlike evidence showing only
that no lessening of competition had yet occurred, the proof concerning the weak coal reserve position necessarily implied an inability to
compete. The Court concluded that post-acquisition evidence was
not only pertinent, but that the trial court was fully justified in relying on it.
In response to the government's contention that the trial court's
reliance on the limited resources of United Electric was a misconstruction of the "failing company" defense, the Court decided that
the government had missed the point of the argument. While agreeBrown Shoe Co. v. United States, 370 U.S. at 323.
415 U.S. at 504. See FTC v. Consolidated Foods Corp., 380 U.S. 592 (1965);
United States v. E.I. DuPont de Nemour & Co., 353 U.S. 586 (1957). A merger may
be attacked long after its consummation when its anticompetitive effect occurs at a
later date. Assuming post-merger evidence of no anticompetitive effect is limited in
probativeness, Justice Stewart notes that the government has a "heads I win, tails you
lose" advantage over a § 7 defendant:
[P]ost-merger evidence showing a lessening of competition may constitute an "incipiency" on which to base a divestiture suit, but evidence showing that such lessening has not, in fact, occurred cannot
be accorded "too much weight."
415 U.S. at 505 n.13.
US
"'
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ing that the "failing company" defense had been strictly limited in
recent court decisions," ' the Court recognized that the trial court had
not concluded that United Electric was a failing company, but rather
that the finding of inadequate reserves demonstrated the unpersuasiveness of the government's statistical case. The Court expressly refused to consider the questions of product and geographic
markets. Having concluded that the statistical presentation by the
government did not establish that a substantial lessening of competition was likely to occur in any market, it was superfluous to consider
what relevant markets might exist had such an anticompetitive effect
been demonstrated.
In contrast, the dissent did not agree that the merger could be
analyzed without a determination of the relevant market. In the view
of Mr. Justice Douglas, while the energy market might be one appropriate line of commerce for testing the merger's anticompetitive effect, another appropriate line of commerce would be the coal market.
He concluded that coal had both price advantages and operational
disadvantages combining to make it an economically significant submarket within the energy market. Consumer preference, price differences and the lack of functional interchangeability for certain end
uses all combined to demonstrate the uniqueness of coal."'
The dissent also disagreed with the court's treatment of the geographic market question. Once again, it emphasized that a finding
of no anticompetitive effect in one relevant geographic market did not
necessarily imply the absence of such effects in other relevant markets. It further criticized the trial court's undue emphasis on standard rail rates, because much of the coal shipped in the United States
is not subject to ordinary rail rates. The majority's error in this regard
is amply demonstrated by the overlapping distribution patterns of
M,United States v. Greater Buffalo Press, Inc., 402 U.S. 549 (1971); Citizen Publishing Co. v. United States, 394 U.S. 131 (1969); United States v. Third Nat'l Bank,
390 U.S. 171 (1968).
"I The dissent was unable to distinguish the energy market-coal market relationship from the fact situtation in United States v. Alcoa, 377 U.S. 271 (1964), in which
aluminum conductor had "little consumer acceptance" for many purposes but its
substantial price advantage gave it a competitive edge in areas of the market where
price was the most important single factor.
Despite the existence of some competition from other forms of conductor, those factors were sufficient to set aluminum conductor apart as
an economically significant § 7 submarket. That precedent seems to
be indistinguishable; and thus whatever the existence of a § 7 energy
market, coal constitutes an economically significant submarket for §
7 purposes.
415 U.S. at 517 (Douglas, J., dissenting).
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the parties to the acquisition and the fact that they sold one-half of
their output to the same customers at the same facilities. Finally, the
dissent found fault with the district court's treatment of the anticompetitive effect issue, chiefly because the lower court had failed to
make clear the standard used in reaching its ultimate conclusion. The
dissent argued that the lower court had failed to mention the relevant
market shares or to specify the effect of the combination on industry
concentration. It further contended that reliance on such facts as the
difference in methods of extraction of the coal between the two companies and the fact that only one sold metallurgical coal was simply
irrelevant to an evaluation of the anticompetitive effect of the acquisition. The dissent concluded with a bitter attack on the majority:
On the basis of a record so devoid of findings based on correct
legal standards, the judgment may not be affirmed except on
a deep-seated judicial bias against § 7 of the Clayton Act. We
should remand the case to the District Court with directions
to assess the impact of the. . . combination on the Illinois and
Eastern Interior Coal Province Sales area coal markets as of
1959. We should direct the court to make findings of respective
market shares, and further to evaluate United Electric's viability as an independent producer or as the possible "acquiree"
of a company other than General Dynamics as of 1959, in
light of the strict standards applicable to the failing company
defense. Since we abdicate our duty for responsible review
and accept the mere conclusion that no § 7 violation is
established on the basis of a record with none of these necessary findings, I dissent from the affirmance of the District
Court's judgement. 2 '
General Dynamics represents something of a departure for the
Court in merger cases. Until GeneralDynamics, the government carried its burden of proof in § 7 cases by introducing statistical evidence
of concentration. As a practical matter this shifted the burden of
proving no anticompetitive effect to the defendants. The defendants'
burden was difficult, and in case after case the Court endorsed the
government's statistical case. In General Dynamics, the Supreme
Court actually used "other pertinent factors" first to question and
then to dismiss the government's statistical case. The fact that those
factors grew out of the unique shift in the nature of the coal industry
does not preclude introduction of similar kinds of proof in future
10 415 U.S. at 527 (Douglas, J., dissenting) (footnote omitted).
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merger cases. In order to show why the government's statistics are
misleading, defendants will be able to offer trial courts evidence concerning industry structure, and the nature and decline of demand and
other such consideration.
Accordingly, what we may look for in future merger cases is a
return to the full-blown economic inquiry that the Court in the
PhiladelphiaBank case specifically sought to avoid.' 2' In that case,
Justice Brennan speaking for the majority reasoned that the complexity of analyzing anticompetitive effect plus the need to give businessmen a simple standard upon which they could rely with some
confidence dictated the advisability of using market share data "to
simplify the test of illegality.'" 2 Wary of "subverting congressional
intent by permitting a too-broad economic investigation,"'2 the
Court in that and subsequent cases was criticized as having placed
too much emphasis on statistics at the expense of the realities of the
economic situation. Congressional intent was to focus on acquisitions
that would produce anticompetitive effect. Thus there can be no serious doubt that rather than being subverted, congressional intent is
actually effectuated by the introduction of evidence tending to supply
a more precise resolution of that problem. The importance, then, of
General Dynamics is that the Supreme Court has now sanctioned
abandonment of the per se rule based on statistical evidence alone.
While courts must be careful to limit evidence on "other pertinent
matters" to that material likely to enhance the fact finder's understanding of the economic issues, the result in the long run will be a
more equitable approach to merger challenges under § 7. This return
to neutrality is overdue.
The trend toward neutrality was also evidenced in one area of the
regulated industries field. For the second time in two years, the issue
of potential competition in the banking industry was presented to the
Court. In 1973, the judgment of the District Court of Colorado dismissing a § 7 complaint against First National Bancorporation for its
acquisition of the First National Bank of Greeley was affirmed by an
equally divided Court without opinion.' 24 This Term, the Court in
United States v. Marine Bancorporation,Inc.12s decided that, in
applying the potential competition doctrine to commercial banking,
"I,United States v. Philadelphia Nat'l Bank, 374 U.S. 321 (1963).
121Id. at 362.
In Id.

"I2United States v. First Nat'l Bancorp., Inc., 410 U.S. 577 (1973) (Powell, J., not
participating).
1- 418 U.S. 602 (1974).
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courts must take into account federal and state regulation and particularly the legal barriers to entry.
The National Bank of Commerce (NBC) was a Seattle-based
bank wholly owned by a registered bank holding company, Marine
Bancorporation, Inc. In terms of assets, deposits and loans it was the
second largest banking organization with headquarters in the State
of Washington." 6 Although it operated 107 branch banking offices
within the state, it had no branch offices in Spokane. The Washington Trust Bank (WTB) was headquartered in Spokane. WTB, with
seven branch offices in the Spokane area, was the ninth largest banking organization in the state with assets of $112 million, total deposits
of $95.6 million and loans at $57.6 million. 12
The banking market in Washington was concentrated with the
five largest in the state holding 74.3% of the total commercial bank
deposits and operating 61.3% of the banking offices. As of June 30,
1972, the two largest banking organizations in the state held approximately one-half of the total deposits and operated over one-third of
the banking offices. In the Spokane metropolitan area, there were six
banking organizations operating. One organization held an aggregate
of 42% of the total deposits and another, some 30%. WTB held 18.6%
of the total deposits in the area, for an aggregate holding of approximately 92% of total deposits by the top three banks.
The State of Washington has a law restricting geographic expansion by banks. According to the provisions of that law, no statechartered bank can establish any branch in a city or town in which
it does not operate if there is present in that city or town any other
bank.'2 8 Federal law subjects nationally chartered banks to the
branching limitations imposed on their state counterparts.121 Consequently, neither national nor state banks in Washington may expand,
except by merger or acquisition, into cities or towns that already have
banking organizations. In addition, Washington law requires that
new banks not merge with any other bank for a period of at least 10
years from the date of approval of the articles of incorporation without the consent of the State Supervisor of Banking,' and a bank that
acquires another bank generally cannot branch from the acquired
212

At the end of 1971, National Bank of Commerce had total assets of $1.8 billion,

total deposits of $1.6 billion and total loans of $881.3 million. The largest banking
organization in the state, Seattle-First National Bank, had assets of $2.8 billion, deposits of $2.5 billion and loans of $1.4 billion. 418 U.S. at 606 & n.1.
' Id. at 607.
' WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 30.40.020 (1961).
12 12 U.S.C. § 36(c) (1970).
" WASH. REv. CODE ANN. § 30.08.020(7) (1961).
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bank. 3 ' Finally, multibank holding companies are prohibited in
Washington, 32 thus making it impossible to simulate branching by
arranging a number of unit banks under a bank holding company.
In February 1971, Marine, NBC and WTB agreed to merge the
latter into NBC. The Comptroller of the Currency approved the
merger pursuant to the Bank Merger Act of 19 6 6 .ln The United States
then filed suit within the 30-day limitation period set out in the Bank
Merger Act of 1966.'1 The complaint contained no allegations that
the acquisition would damage actual competition, but instead focused on the issue of potential competition. Specifically, the United
States alleged that § 7 of the Clayton Act was violated by the acquisition in that it removed the possibility that NBC would enter the
Spokane market de novo or through a toehold acquisition. The government argued that § 7 was also violated by removing the procompetitive effect of NBC's presence on the fringe of the Spokane market
and by putting an end to the possibility that WTB would develop into
a statewide counterweight to the existing large statewide banks.
Following trial the district court ruled for the defendants.", The
trial court found that the merger would increase competition in commercial banking in the Spokane metropolitan area and would have
no anticompetitive effect. In addition, the court concluded that in
light of the legal and economic barriers to entry other than by acquisition, there was no reasonable probability that NBC would enter the
Spokane market except by the merger route.
It was crucial for the district court that Washington law forbade
de novo branching by NBC in Spokane, and that the government had
failed to establish that there were any other existing banks in Spokane available for acquisition. The court also found-no procompetitive effect from NBC's presence on the fringe of the Spokane market
and concluded that the government had not proved that WTB was
likely to expand beyond the Spokane market into a'statewide bank.
Finally, the trial court saw little likelihood that NBC would become
"'

WASH. REV. CODE ANN.

§ 30.40.020 (1961).

' WASH. REv. CODE ANN. § 30.04.230 (1961).
"1 12 U.S.C. § 1828(c) (1970). Pursuant to 12 U.S.C. § 1828(c)(4) the Comptroller
requested reports on the competitive factors involved from the Attorney General, the
Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation and the Board of Governors of the Federal
Reserve System. Each of these agencies submitted negative reports.
M For a discussion of the dual antitrust scheme for the banking industry, see
Shenefield, Annual Survey of Antitrust Developments-The Year of the Regulated
Industry, 31 WASH. & LEE L. Rav. 1, 22-39 (1974).
'

United States v. Marine Bancorp., Inc., 1973-1 Trade Cases

Wash. 1973).

74,496 (W.D.
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entrenched as a dominant bank in the Spokane metropolitan area as
the result of the merger, or that it would trigger a series of defensive
mergers by other banks in the state.13 The district court accordingly
dismissed the complaint. The government appealed directly to the
Supreme Court under the Expediting Act." 7
The opinion by Mr. Justice Powell'38 first addressed the relevant
market question. As to definition of the product market, the opinion
agreed with the district court's finding that the relevant market was
commercial banking and the cluster of products and services involved. 39 The district court had found that the relevant geographic
market was the Spokane metropolitan area. Mr. Justice Powell had
no reason to doubt that the metropolitan area constituted a reasonable approximation of the area within which the Spokane banks offered most of their services and to which Spokane consumers could
practicably turn for alternatives. In addition, it was the area in which
the effect of the merger on competition was "direct and immediate."'' 0 The Court therefore affirmed the holding that the Spokane
metropolitan area was the appropriate geographic market.
Although it had stipulated to that market area, the government
nevertheless contended that the entire state was also an appropriate
"section of the country," in spite of its concession that the state was
not a banking market and that WTB only competed in the Spokane
metropolitan area. Concerned that this acquisition would trigger others leading to domination of all banking in the state by a few large
banks, the government attempted to argue that "section of the country" and relevant geographic markets might not necessarily be identical, and that the state as a whole was the appropriate context within
which to assess the probability of a development of a network of
oligopolistic banking organizations. The Court rejected this reading
"' The district court also made findings of fact with regard to the "convenience
and needs" defense set out in the Bank Merger Act of 1966, 12 U.S.C. § 1828(c)(5)(B)
(1970). The trial court concluded that even if the acquisition violated the standards of
§ 7 of the Clayton Act, it was nevertheless lawful under the Bank Merger Act of 1966.
The Supreme Court declined to evaluate this finding in light of its conclusion that the
acquisition was lawful under the standards of § 7.
137 15 U.S.C. § 29 (1970). The Court noted probable jurisdiction. 414 U.S. 907
(1973).
"' Burger, C.J., Stewart, Blackmun and Rehnquist, JJ., concurring in the majority opinion. White, J., with whom Brennan and Marshall, JJ., joined, dissented.
Douglas, J., took no part in the consideration of the case.
"' Accord, United States v. Phillipsburg Nat'l Bank, 399 U.S. 350 (1970); United
States v. Third Nat'l Bank, 390 U.S. 171 (1968); United States v. Philadelphia Nat'l
Bank, 374 U.S. 321 (1963).
"I United States v. Philadelphia Nat'l Bank, 374 U.S. 321, 357 (1963).
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of § 7 as unsupported by precedent and largely speculative on the
record in the trial court. Given that § 7 was designed to arrest mergers
''at a time when the trend to a lessening of competition in a line of
commerce [was] still in its incipience,"'' the Court held that the
'
legislation concerned probabilities, not "ephemeral possibilities."'
The Government's underlying concern for a linkage or network
of statewide oligopolistic banking markets is, on this record at
least, considerably closer to "ephemeral possibilities" than to
"probabilities." To assume, on the basis of essentially no evidence, that the challenged merger will tend to produce a statewide linkage of oligopolies is to espouse a per se rule against
geographic market extension mergers like the one at issue here.
No § 7 case from
this Court has gone that far, and we do not
43
do so today.
Accordingly, the majority concluded that the appropriate "section of
the country" and the "relevant geographic market" were the
same-the Spokane metropolitan area.
The opinion then addressed application of the potential competition doctrine to the banking industry. After briefly tracing the history
of the potential competition doctrine"' in the nonregulated industry
context, the opinion interpreted the Falstaffcase4 5 as focusing on the
likely effects of the acquiring firm that has a position on the fringe
of the target market. The opinion recited those factors that cause
market extension mergers to be held unlawful: (1) if the target market is substantially concentrated; (2) if the acquiring firm has the
characteristics, capabilities and economic incentive to render it a
perceived potential de novo entrant; and (3) if the acquiring firm's
presence on the fringe of the market has influenced existing participants in that market.
In other words, the Court has interpreted § 7 as encompassing
what is commonly known as the "wings effect"-the probability that the acquiring firm prompted premerger procompetitive effects within the target market by being perceived by the
existing firms in that market as likely to enter de novo.'"
"' Brown Shoe Co. v. United States, 370 U.S. 294, 317 (1962). See, e.g., United
States v. Von's Grocery Co., 384 U.S. 270 (1966).
"l 370 U.S. at 323.
113418 U.S. at 623 (footnote omitted).
"I The potential competition doctrine is found chiefly in United States v. Falstaff
Brewing Corp., 410 U.S. 526 (1973); FTC v. Procter &Gamble Co., 386 U.S. 568 (1967);
United States v. Penn-Olin Chem. Co., 378 U.S. 158 (1964).
"a United States v. Falstaff Brewing Corp., 410 U.S. 526 (1973).
"' 418 U.S. at 625 (citation omitted).
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The Court had never accepted the government's theory of potential
competition. In Falstaff, the opinion expressly reserved the issue
whether the potential competition doctrine proscribes a market extension merger solely on the ground that such a merger eliminates the
possibility of deconcentration that might have taken place either
through de novo entry or through the toe-hold acquisition of a smaller
existing concern.
The Court first addressed the issue of whether the potential competition doctrine applied with full force to commercial banks. The
opinion held that geographic market extension mergers by commercial banks must pass muster under the potential competition doctrine
of § 7 cases. However, the Court further concluded that the application of the doctrine to commercial banking must take into account
the unique federal and state regulatory restraints on entry into new
markets in that line of commerce.
After reciting the record of failure of the government's position in
the eight previous cases tried under the potential competition doctrine," 7 Mr. Justice Powell pointed out that an important reason why
the government had been uniformly unsuccessful in those cases is
that the doctrine fails to give full weight to the extensive federal and
regulatory barriers to entry into commercial banking markets. The
reason that the omission is of such great importance is that ease of
entry on the part of the acquiring firm is the central premise for the
potential competition doctrine. In the conventional manufacturing
context, firms are free to base their decisions regarding market entry
on any number of different factors, particularly the profitability of
entry in the target market. In banking, however, regulatory barriers
to entry have been developed since the Great Depression to avoid
superfluous banking firms which may increase the probability of
bank failures. This regulatory control reduces the likelihood of the
acquiring bank's entry into new markets de novo if precluded from
entry by acquisition. "In this case, . . . there are serious questions
whether an 'alternative to the merger route' through branching or a
functional equivalent is a legal or feasible method of entry by NBC
' 48
into the Spokane market.'
4I In addition to the district court decision in Marine Bancorporation,see United
States v. Connecticut Nat'l Bank, 362 F. Supp. 240 (D. Conn. 1973), vacated and
remanded, 418 U.S. 656 (1974); United States v. United Virginia Bankshares, Inc., 347
F. Supp. 891 (E.D. Va. 1972); United States v. First Nat'l Bancorporation, Inc., 329
F. Supp. 1003 (D. Colo. 1971), aff'd mem., 410 U.S. 577 (1973); United States v. Idaho
First Nat'l Bank, 315 F. Supp. 261 (D. Idaho 1970); United States v. First Nat'l Bank
of Maryland, 310 F. Supp. 157 (D. Md. 1970); United States v. First Nat'l Bank of
Jackson, 301 F. Supp. 1161 (S.D. Miss. 1969); United States v. Crocker-Anglo Nat'l
Bank, 277 F. Supp. 133 (N.D. Cal. 1967).
"1 418 U.S. at 630.
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Mr. Justice Powell then proceeded to examine the structure of the
Spokane metropolitan area commercial banking market, because
potential competition has meaning only in concentrated markets.
Obviously, in markets with adequate actual competition, the existence of a potential entrant at the edge of the market will not influence
firms already in the market. The government's data, which showed
that the three largest banking organizations including WTB controlled approximately 92% of the total deposits in Spokane, persuaded the majority that the government had established a prima
facie case that the Spokane market was a candidate for the potential
competition doctrine. Consequently, the burden was transferred to
the appellees to show that the concentration ratios, "which can be
unreliable indicators of actual market behavior,"' 49 did not accurately
reflect the state of competition within the Spokane market. In this
regard, the Court was forced to conclude that the appellees had not
carried their burden and that the district court had erred in holding
to the contrary. In particular, no evidence had been introduced concerning the absence of parallel behavior in pricing or the provision of
banking services in the market: While some aspects of competition
among banks were muted by regulation, the Court found that other
aspects were totally unregulated and could be an accurate reflection
of the presence or absence of significant parallel conduct. In particular, the Court looked for "the much advertised differences in various
forms of services offered by banks which are in the same geographic
market."'50
On the other hand, the majority was not surprised that the commercial banking market in Spokane was structurally concentrated
since, as the government's expert witness conceded, all banking markets in the country are likely to be concentrated:
This is so because as a country we have made the policy judgment to restrict entry into commercial banking in order to
promote bank safety. Thus, most banking markets in theory
will be subject to the potential competition doctrine. But the
same factor that usually renders such markets concentrated
and theoretical prospects for potential competition § 7
cases-regulatory barriers to new entry-will also make it difficult to establish that the doctrine invalidates a particular
geographic market extension merger.'
"' Id. at 631, citing United States v. General Dynamics Corp., 415 U.S. 486 (1974).

418 U.S. at 632 n.34.
m Id. at 632.
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The Court then came to the heart of the government's case,
namely, the contention that the challenged merger violated § 7 of the
Clayton Act because it eliminated the likelihood that, if the merger
were precluded, NBC would enter the market either de novo or
through a foot-hold acquisition. The government argued that utilization of one of these alternative methods was preferable to acquisition
since it would be likely to produce deconcentration of the market or
other procompetitive effects. The Court insisted that there were two
essential preconditions upon which the government's theory was
built. First, the government must prove that NBC had available
feasible means of entry into the market other than by acquiring
WTB. Second, the government must then show that those means
offered a substantial likelihood of producing deconcentration of that
market or other significant procompetitive effects.
As to the first point, it was undisputed that NBC could not under
state law establish de novo branches in Spokane and that its parent
holding company could not hold more than 25% of the stock of any
other bank. Thus, entry depended upon the possibility that NBC
might acquire another existing bank in the Spokane market. The
government contended that such an acquisition was possible, either
by the device of "sponsorship," in which NBC would form a new bank
through friendly stockholders and then ultimately acquire the bank,
or acquire a smaller bank already existing in the market as a toe-hold
acquisition. As to the first alternative, the Court declined to reach a
decision on the issue since even if it were permitted by state regulatory authorities it was unlikely to produce any significant procompetitive benefits in the Spokane commercial banking market. In particular, state law would not allow NBC to branch from the sponsored
bank after it was acquired, so that the entry into Spokane would be
frozen at the level of its initial acquisition. Such a pigmy entry offers
virtually no hope of producing the deconcentration for which the
government yearned. As to the second suggested method of entry, the
Court similarly found that it was wholly unlikely to produce significant procompetitive benefits since branching would be limited.
Thus, in the Court's view, the government had not offered a persuasive case on feasible alternative methods of entry, nor had it established that the alternate means offered a reasonable prospect of
long-term structural improvement or other benefits in the target market. The Court thus held against the government on its principal
argument-i.e., the potential competition theory. Indeed, since the
preconditions for that version of the theory were absent, the issue
whether such a formulation of the potential competition doctrine
could ever be valid was expressly reserved. For emphasis, the Court
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added a warning: "We reiterate that this case concerns an industry
in which new entry
is extensively regulated by the state and federal
52
governments."
Mr. Justice Powell then proceeded to examine the government's
case under the more orthodox theories of potential competitionperceived potential entry. 53 Because the government had failed to
establish that NBC had alternative methods of entry, the majority
was willing to assume that firms in the Spokane market are likewise
aware of the barriers that rendered NBC an unlikely entrant except
by merger with WTB. In light of those barriers, the Court concluded
that it was unlikely that NBC exerted any meaningful influence on
competition within the market by standing "in the wings." The Court
thus affirmed the district court's finding that the threat of entry by
means other than merger did not have a significant effect on the
competitive practices of banks already in the market. Furthermore,
the Court agreed with the trial court's view that there was no reasonable probability that WTB might expand outside its Spokane headquarters into a direct competitor statewide.
Mr. Justice Powell clearly- summarized the lessons of Marine
Bancorporationfor the Antitrust Division of the Department of Justice. First, courts must take into account the extensive federal and
state regulation of banks. The Court's affirmance of the trial court
judgment rested primarily on state statutory barriers to de novo entry
and to expansion following entry into new geographic markets. The
Court concluded with a "textbook" for future trials of bank merger
cases:
In States where such stringent barriers exist and in the absence
of a likelihood of entrenchment, the potential competition doctrine-grounded as it is on relative freedom of entry on the part
of the acquiring firm-will seldom bar a geographic market
extension merger by a commercial bank. In States that permit
free branching or multibank holding companies, courts hearing
cases involving such mergers should take into account all relevant factors, including the barriers to entry created by state
and federal control over the issuance of new bank charters.
Testimony by responsible regulatory officials that they will not
grant new charters in the target market is entitled to great
weight, although it is not determinative. To avoid the danger
of subjecting the enforcement of the antitrust laws to the policy of a particular bank regulatory official or agency, courts
152Id. at
"5

639.

See United States v. Falstaff Brewing Corp., 410 U.S. 526 (1973).
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should look also to the size and growth prospects of the target
market, the size and number of banking organizations participating in it, and past practices of regulatory agencies in granting charters. If regulatory restraints are not determinative,
courts should consider the factors that are pertinent to any
potential competition case, including the economic feasibility
and likelihood of de novo entry, the capabilities and expansion
history of the acquiring firm, and the performance as well as
the structural characteristics of the target market.'54
Mr. Justice White, writing for the dissent, was displeased with
what he perceived to be a weakening of § 7. "For the second time this
Term, the Court's new antitrust majority had chipped away at the
policies of § 7 of the Clayton Act."'55 The dissent characterized the
majority opinion as redefining the elements of potential competition
and escalating the burden of proof required to show that a merger
violates § 7. Given the admittedly concentrated commercial banking
market in the Spokane metropolitan area, the dissenters found the
two alternative methods of entry suggested by the government both
attractive and feasible. For them, it was simply incredible that, in
absence of the merger with WTB, NBC would not have proceeded to
acquire a smaller bank or to assist in the sponsorship of a new bank.
As to the contention that entry on such a limited scale would not
contribute to the deconcentration of the Spokane market and would
therefore have no current influence on competitive practices within
the market, the dissenters simply disagreed with the majority.
Mr. Justice White criticized the majority position that the absence of branching potential rendered toe-hold entry or sponsorship
an unmeaningful alternative:
I cannot accept the per se view that without branching an
able and willing newcomer to the banking market cannot be
considered a sufficiently substantial competitive influence,
immediately or in the foreseeable future, so that its loss to the
market would warrant application of § 7. This is particularly
true if the putative entrant is a large and successful banking
organization with wide experience in developing new markets.5'
The dissent also had difficulty with the majority's disposition of
the "wings" theory of potential competition. It was unable to explain,

"
"'

418 U.S. at 641-42.
Id. at 642.
Id. at 647.

ANTITRUST DEVELOPMENTS

1975l

if the majority's branch disability theory was correct, why the evidence showed that bankers in the Spokane area had discussed NBC's
interest in entry. In Mr. Justice White's view, the possibility of entry
and the possibility of competition following entry were sufficiently
strong to restrain anticompetitive practices.
But the minority was most concerned about the broader application of the majority's view of the potential competition doctrine.
While it conceded that the Court's opinion was purportedly limited
to industries in which new entry is regulated by state and federal
government, the dissent pointed out that "barriers" to competition
played a large part in the majority's analysis. Many non-regulated
industries are afflicted with barriers to competition and, accordingly,
the dissent was concerned that the precedent may have a wider application throughout the economy than the majority cared to foresee.
A second bank merger case last Term produced further illumination of the problem of selecting product and geographic markets for
analysis of bank acquisitions. In United States v. Connecticut National Bank,'57 Mr. Justice Powell writing for the majority'58 reversed
the district court's selection both of the product market and of the
geographic market, and remanded the case for further consideration.
The Connecticut National Bank (CNB) desired to consolidate
with First New Haven National Bank (FNH). The two banks had
offices in contiguous areas in the southwestern portion of Connecticut.' 9 CNB was the fourth largest commercial bank in the State of
Connecticut with approximately 6% of commercial bank deposits.
FNH was the eighth largest commercial bank with approximately 4%
of the commercial bank deposits. As of the end of 1971, the five
largest commercial banks in Connecticut held 61% of the deposits in
the state and the ten largest banks held 83%.
The government brought a civil action challenging the consolidation under § 7 but following a lengthy trial, the trial court dismissed
the government's complaint.' 0 Thereafter the government appealed

"5

Id. at 656.

' The majority in this case was comprised of Burger, C.J., and Stewart, Black-

mun, Powell and Rehnquist, JJ. White, J., with whom Douglas, Brennan and Marshall, JJ., joined, concurred in part and dissented in part.
"I3Although there was overlap and therefore direct competition in a small area

located between the banks' headquarters, the banks assured the district court that the
overlapping offices would be divested so that the overlap of operation would be mini-

mized. The district court held this divestiture plan eliminated antitrust difficulties
presented by the horizontal merger of direct competitors.
'8 362 F. Supp. 240 (1973).
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directly to the Supreme Court under the Expediting Act.'6 ' On appeal, the Court disagreed with the trial court's decisions on the product and geographic market, and therefore declined to reach the issue
of anticompetitive effect.
The district court had concluded that the appropriate "line of
commerce" included both commercial banks and savings banks. Its
conclusion was based on its view of the evidence that savings banks
are direct competitors of commercial banks for real estate mortgages,
personal loans, and for individual, partnership and corporate deposits
and also for commercial loans. In addition, the trial court noted that
state law would shortly permit savings banks to offer personal checking accounts.
While agreeing that savings banks and commercial banks are direct competitors for many services, the Court was unable to reach the
same conclusion. For Mr. Justice Powell, the degree of direct competition was not sufficient to treat savings banks and commercial banks
as being in the same product market. The unique cluster of services
repeatedly mentioned by the Supreme Court in earlier cases "' was
what distinguished commercial banks as a product market. Nevertheless, as the majority saw the evidence, savings banks were not
competitive in the market for loans to commercial enterprises. In
addition, the Court discerned that commercial banks in the state
offered credit card plans, trust services, investment services and
loans for securities purchases, in addition to computer and account
services and letters of credit, none of which were offered by savings
banks. This alone made it inappropriate to consider them direct competitors.
We do not say . . . that in a case involving a merger of
commercial banks a court may never consider savings banks
and commercial banks as operating in the same line of commerce, no matter how similar their services and economic behavior. At some stage in the development of savings banks it
will be unrealistic to distinguish them from commercial banks
for purposes of the Clayton Act. In Connecticut, that point
may well be reached when and if savings banks become significant participants in the marketing of bank services to commercial enterprises. But, in adherence to the tests set forth in our
earlier bank merger cases, which we are constrained to follow,
we hold that such a point has not yet been reached.' 3
"1 15 U.S.C. § 29 (1970). The Court noted probable jurisdiction. 414 U.S. 1127

(1974).
6I United States v. Phillipsburg Nat'l Bank, 399 U.S. 350 (1970); United States
v. Philadelphia Nat'l Bank, 374 U.S. 321 (1963).
"1 418 U.S. at 666 (citations omitted).
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Accordingly, the Court remanded the case to the district court with
instructions to treat commercial banking as the relevant product
market.
With regard to the relevant geographic market, the district court
had determined it to be the state as a whole. Mr. Justice Powell found
this conclusion defective on several grounds. First, if the state were
the relevant geographic market, the case should be analyzed not as a
potential competition case, but rather as a direct competition case.
In that event, because the aggregate market share of both banks
amounted to approximately 10%, the consolidation would have been
in jeopardy under conventional merger standards."'
Second, the two banks did not operate statewide. Quoting Marine
Bancorporation,the opinion stated that the relevant geographic market is the area in which the acquired bank is in significant and direct
competition with other banks. Definition of that area in accordance
with the Court's other decision in the bank merger area indicates that
the market must be drawn narrowly to reflect the immediate and
direct effects of the merger on competition." 5 Consequently, the
Court stated that on remand the lower court must determine the
geographic market in which CNB operates and to which the bulk of
its customers may turn for alternative commercial bank services, and
then make the same determination with respect to FNH.
The task is important, because the definition of the respective
geographic markets determine the number of alternate avenues of entry theoretically open to CNB in piercing FNH's area
of significant competitive influence and vice versa.'
Mr. Justice Powell noted that the government's evidence on this
subject, while not necessarily required to produce a market definition
with scientific precision, must nevertheless be sufficient to permit a
rough approximation of localized banking markets. The Court agreed
with the trial court that reliance on Standard Metropolitan Statistical Areas (SMSA) is insufficient, because these are developed by the
Office of Management and Budget to determine areas of economic
and social integration without regard to criteria particularly relevant
to the banking industry.
As in Marine Bancorporation,the Supreme Court rejected the
government contention that the state, although not a banking market, is nevertheless a "section of the country" within the meaning of
§ 7 of the Clayton Act. In addition, the Court held that the theory of
" See United States v. Von's Grocery Co., 384 U.S. 270 (1966).
"5 See United States v. Philadelphia Nat'l Bank, 374 U.S. 321 (1963).
'"

418 U.S. at 669.
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"linked oligopolies" was devoid of evidentiary support on the facts
presented, as it was in Marine Bancorporation.In the Court's view,
to adopt the theory would be to espouse a per se rule against geographic market extension mergers by commercial banks in the state
as long as any town remained open to de novo branching. 7
The dissenters agreed with the majority opinion as to the relevant
line of commerce, but were unable to agree with the determination
of a relevant geographic market. Mr. Justice White espoused the
notion that there might be several possible relevant geographic markets, especially in a potential competition case where a merger might
affect the economic behavior of existing firms in various markets. The
dissenters favored leaving open the possibility that the merger, when
analyzed in terms of the "wings" theory of potential competition,
might have an anticompetitive effect in markets other than those in
which the parties to the acquisition were found.
Marine Bancorporationand ConnecticutNationalBank are interesting for their impact on the requirements of geographic market
definition. Until last Term, there had been a suspicion, based on the
language in United States v. PabstBrewing Co.,'" that the phrase in
§ 7 "any section of the country" did not require any specific definition
of geographic market. This line of reasoning gave rise to two erroneous contentions: (1) § I could be applied without regard to any
particular geographic market; and (2) even if a merger had to be
evaluated in a geographical context, no attempt at market definition
in the traditional sense need be undertaken.
Both of these contentions have now been laid to rest. In Marine
Bancorporation, Mr. Justice Powell interpreted Pabst to hold that
the government had established three relevant markets in that case
and that the requisite anticompetitive effect in any one of them was
sufficient to invalidate the merger." 9 Elsewhere the Court rejected as
inconsistent with precedent the government's proposal that "any section of the country" might not be identical to "relevant geographic
market." 7 0 The Court noted that in no previous § 7 case had the
"I The Supreme Court also observed that the district court had made a finding
that the consolidation met the standards of the "convenience and needs" test of the
Bank Merger Act of 1966, 12 U.S.C. § 1828(c)(5)(B) (1970). The Court, however,
suggested that the findings on the "convenience and needs" defense were not controlling if the trial court erred in the standards applied in judging the status of the
consolidation under the Clayton Act. United States v. Third Nat'l Bank, 390 U.S. 171,
183-84 (1968).
"' 384 U.S. 546, 549-50 (1966).

,' 418 U.S. 621 n.20.
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Court determined the legality of a merger by measuring its effects on
areas where the acquired firm is not a direct competitor.
In Connecticut National Bank, the Court spoke further of geographic markets, and particularly the burden of proof. Citing Pabst
the government had increasingly come to rely on the position that it
was not required to define geographic markets precisely. The Court
agreed but nevertheless imposed on the government the responsibility to come forward with evidence "delineating the rough approxima,,171
tion of localized banking markets ....
In summary, the cases have clarified the problem of geographic
market definition considerably. First, the government must propose
and prove such markets, and second, at least in potential competition
cases, the markets must be areas in which the acquired firm actually
and directly competes. That area must not necessarily be defined
with scientific precision but it must be proved by economic and business evidence.
The Court's assessment of the applicability of the potential competition doctrine in Marine Bancorporationreflects a new neutrality.
The government must now present, not simply theories of anticompetitive effect, but evidence of such harm, and failure realistically to
analyze particular situations will lead to failure for the government's
case.
The government advanced three separate formulations of the
potential competition doctrine. First it argued that in a concentrated
banking market the Spokane acquisition precluded significant deconcentration that could be achieved, in the absence of the acquisition,
by NBC's entry either through a toe-hold acquisition or bank sponsorship. Second, it argued that the acquisition should be prohibited
because of its triggering effect on other banks and the likely development of a network of statewide oligopolies. Finally, it argued that the
disappearance of the "wings" effect of NBC hovering on the edge of
the market was sufficient reason alone for the acquisition to be prohibited.
As in Falstaff, the Court again declined to decide the validity of
the "significant deconcentration" formulation. It did, however, define two essential conditions that must exist before the theory, if
proven, could establish a violation of § 7. First, there must be a
showing that the acquiring bank had available feasible means for
entry into a market other than by acquisition. Second, there must be
a showing that those means offered a substantial likelihood of proagainst statewide parallel practices and entrenchment in conventional § 7 terminology.
The government conceded that the state as a whole was not a banking market.
-U.S. at , 94 S. Ct. at 2796-97.
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ducing deconcentration or other significant procompetitive effects.
These preconditions will be difficult for the government to prove in
any case. In many banking markets in the country there are sufficiently few banks operating that there may well be no candidates for
acquisition. Given the restrictions contained in many state banking
laws on branching from acquired banks, even if there are feasible
alternative means of entry available, the likelihood of significant
entry by acquiring a toe-hold in the market seems remote. Thus,
while the Court purported not to reach the deconcentration issue, its
discussion demonstrates fairly clearly that the avenue is not a promising one for the government to undertake in § 7 cases.
The Court's handling of the "wings" theory seems completely
realistic. It is utterly speculative to argue that competitors in a market perceive of firms outside the market as potential entrants if there
are legal barriers to such entry. To assess bank mergers without taking into account restrictive state banking laws constitutes idle speculation and the Court declined to engage in such an exercise. Obbiously, one probably effect of this decision may be to induce bankers
to reverse their traditional hostility toward restrictive state regulation and to seek the enactment of new laws to enable them to achieve
acquisition programs. Likewise, the decision can be read as an invitation to banks in states already possessing restrictive banking laws to
step up their acquisition timetables.
Such a development would not necessarily be bad. On balance,
in geographic market extension mergers it seems more likely that
procompetitive benefits will be produced than that anticompetitive
effects will result. A large bank's entry into a concentrated market
may have the effect of introducing a broader spectrum of services and
the capacity to offer larger loans. The speculative nature of the asserted anticompetitive effects seems particularly obvious in the Spokane context. First, the acquisition did not decrease the number of
firms actually operating in the Spokane market. Second, there remained a number of potential entrants in the wings so that the disappearance of one potential entrant, if NBC can be characterized as
such, did not decrease the impact of the "wings" effect to any significant degree. In short, the Court's decision stands for the proposition
that the risk of permitting anticompetitive geographic market extension mergers is less than is the risk of losing procompetitive mergers.
Taken together, the Term's three merger cases show a desire to
deal with the economic realities of a particular case rather than simply with market share statistics which may or may not reflect such
realities. The Court's intelligent regard for the legal and economic
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barriers to competition led it in Marine Bancorporationand General
Dynamics to depart from its past practice of permitting its decisions
to depend excessively on market share statistics. The expansion of
the area of relevance in a merger case will undoubtedly produce decisions that are more realistic, even at the expense of taking more time
and resources. Yet the function of the antitrust court is not necessarily to reach a quick decision, but rather a correct one.
HI.
THE NEW ANTITRUST MAJORITY
In his dissent in Marine Bancorporation,Mr. Justice White bitterly described the Court's new antitrust majority." 2 It is true, as
many will say, that the new majority showed itself last Term to be
both more cautious and more conservative in dealing with antitrust
plaintiffs, government or private. But that formulation misses the
point. In two quite separate areas of antitrust concern, class actions
and mergers, the majority introduced into the law a respect on the
one hand for the realities of competition, and on the other for the
language of statutes and procedural rules. Both areas will be repeatedly revisited by the Court in the years to come. This past Term will
be remembered as a year in which balance and neutrality were restored to the Court's antitrust considerations. The results were not
foreordained by the fact that the government was on one side or that
large corporations were on the other; opinions were more logical and
more lawyer-like. An improvement in the quality of the Court's decisions and in the public regard for those decisions will be the inevitable result. Thus, the past Term can be regarded as a good omen for
the future application of the antitrust laws and for the fair effectuation of those policies that serve to promote vigorous competition.
172Of

course, in Eisen, Zahn and Kewanee Oil Co. v. Bicron Corp., 416 U.S. 470

(1974), a trade secret case in which the "new antitrust majority" held that a state trade

secret law was not preempted by federal patent law, Mr. Justice White joined the new
majority. Thus his complaint seems directed against the majority only in the merger
cases.

